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FIDUCIARY JUDGMENT RULES
JULIAN VELASCO*
ABSTRACT
Because of the strong moral rhetoric and robust equitable remedies
available in fiduciary law, it is not surprising to find lawyers and
legal scholars seeking to expand the reach of fiduciary law principles
into new relationships and new areas of law. However, expansion
often does not work very well because of the demanding and
pervasive nature of fiduciary duties. Thus, jurists often turn to the
business judgment rule and its policy of underenforcement of
fiduciary duties as a way to fit fiduciary law principles into other
areas of law. The problem with this approach is that it is based on
a deficient understanding of the corporate law model. The business
judgment rule is not an arbitrary abstention policy but rather a
prudential policy decision that advances the beneficiaries’ interests
in the unique context of the business setting. Because its theoretical
underpinnings tend to be absent from other relationships, the
business judgment rule cannot serve as a model for indiscriminate
expansion of fiduciary areas of law. For the same reasons, any policy
of deferential review of fiduciary duties would have to be based on
other considerations.
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Criddle, Simone Degeling, Andrew Gold, Matthew Harding, Lusina Ho, Arthur Laby,
Rosemary Langford, Ethan Leib, Paul Miller, and Lionel Smith; as well as Megan
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INTRODUCTION
Fiduciary law is not so much a separate area of law, like contracts
and torts, as it is a set of legal principles that is incorporated in
other substantive areas of law, such as trusts, agency, and corporate
law.1 Fiduciary law principles are distinctive in many ways. First,
fiduciary law employs strong moral rhetoric that is uncharacteristic
outside of criminal law.2 Thus, for example, it tends to demand the
“utmost good faith” and “undivided and unselfish loyalty” of fidu-
ciaries.3 Second, fiduciary law principles impose demanding and
pervasive duties upon fiduciaries,4 often utilizing prophylactic rules
to secure their objective.5 Finally, fiduciary law opens up strong
equitable remedies that are generally unavailable to plaintiffs in
other areas of law.6
Characteristics such as these make fiduciary law attractive to
jurists in other areas of law. It is not surprising to find lawyers and
legal scholars seeking to expand the reach of fiduciary law princi-
ples into new relationships and new areas of law. Three particularly
interesting examples will be considered in this Article7—friends,8
parents,9 and politicians10—but there are many others.11
1. Julian Velasco, Fiduciary Duties and Fiduciary Outs, 21 GEO.MASON L.REV. 157, 159-
60 (2013).
2. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J.L.
& ECON. 425, 434 (1993).
3. Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939).
4. See, e.g., Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 10 (Del. 1998) (“[F]iduciary duty does not
operate intermittently but is the constant compass by which all director actions for the
corporation ... must be guided.”).
5. TAMAR FRANKEL, FIDUCIARY LAW 108 (2011) (“[T]he duty of loyalty is manifested by
important preventive rules. Such rules prohibit actions even though they are not necessarily
injurious to entrustors.” (footnote omitted)).
6. See Samuel L. Bray, Fiduciary Remedies, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY
LAW 449, 449-50 (Evan J. Criddle, Paul B. Miller & Robert H. Sitkoff eds., 2019).
7. See infra Part III.B.
8. See Ethan J. Leib, Friends as Fiduciaries, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 665 (2009).
9. See Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, 81 VA. L. REV. 2401
(1995).
10. See D. Theodore Rave, Politicians as Fiduciaries, 126 HARV. L. REV. 671 (2013).
11. See, e.g., Andrew Kent, Ethan J. Leib & Jeb Handelsman Shugerman, Faithful
Execution and Article II, 132 HARV. L. REV. 2111 (2019); Ethan J. Leib & Stephen R. Galoob,
Fiduciary Principles and Public Offices, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW, supra
note 6, at 303; D. Theodore Rave, Fiduciary Principles and the State, in THE OXFORD
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The problem with expanding the reach of fiduciary law into new
areas of law is that it often does not quite work. Fiduciary law is
very demanding. While it works well in traditional fiduciary
relationships, it would be much more difficult to apply in other
relationships. Nevertheless, many remain interested in extending
fiduciary law principles into new areas of law and seek solutions to
these difficulties.
One technique that is often employed is a resort to the corporate
law model. One of the widest-known doctrines of corporate law is
the business judgment rule, which applies a deferential standard of
review to director actions that are undertaken in good faith.12 It is,
essentially, a policy of underenforcement of fiduciary duties.13
Advocates of expanding the reach of fiduciary law tend to point to
the business judgment rule as a solution. Although a strict trust law
model of fiduciary law could not be adopted in other areas of law,
they argue that the more flexible corporate law model could. Thus,
they often call for a “fiduciary judgment rule”—a “friendship
judgment rule,”14 a “parental judgment rule,”15 or a “political judg-
ment rule”16—that would subject the new fiduciaries to deferential
HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 6, at 323; Jack M. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries
and the First Amendment, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1183 (2016); Kiel Brennan-Marquez, Fourth
Amendment Fiduciaries, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 611 (2015); Margaux J. Hall, A Fiduciary
Theory of Health Entitlements, 35 CARDOZO L.REV. 1729 (2014); Ethan J. Leib, David L. Ponet
& Michael Serota, A Fiduciary Theory of Judging, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 699 (2013); Edward B.
Foley, Voters as Fiduciaries, 2015 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 153; Heather Harrell, Direct-to-Consumer
Advertising of Prescription Pharmaceuticals, the Learned Intermediary Doctrine, and
Fiduciary Duties, 8 IND.HEALTH L.REV. 69 (2011); Evan J. Criddle, Fiduciary Administration:
Rethinking Popular Representation in Agency Rulemaking, 88 TEX. L. REV. 441 (2010); Evan
Fox-Decent, The Fiduciary Nature of State Legal Authority, 31 QUEEN’S L.J. 259 (2005); Brett
G. Scharffs & John W. Welch, An Analytic Framework for Understanding and Evaluating the
Fiduciary Duties of Educators, 2005BYUEDUC.&L.J. 159; Zanita E. Fenton, Faith in Justice:
Fiduciaries, Malpractice & Sexual Abuse by Clergy, 8 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 45 (2001). 
12. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (“The business judgment rule is ... a
presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an
informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best
interests of the company.”).
13. See Julian Velasco, A Defense of the Corporate Law Duty of Care, 40 J. CORP. L. 647,
648, 651 & n.13 (2015).
14. Leib, supra note 8, at 709.
15. Scott & Scott, supra note 9, at 2438.
16.  See Rave, supra note 10, at 677. It should be noted that Rave does not actually use
the term “political judgment rule.”
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judicial review, thus overcoming the difficulties posed by demanding
fiduciary duties.
Unfortunately, these arguments are based on a deficient under-
standing of the business judgment rule. The business judgment rule
may be an abstention doctrine,17 but it is not an arbitrary one.
Rather, it represents a prudential policy decision that balances
competing interests in a special context. It is a practical response to
the idiosyncratic needs of the business setting.
In this Article, I argue that the business judgment rule cannot
serve as a model for indiscriminate expansion of fiduciary law prin-
ciples into new areas of law because its theoretical underpinnings
tend to be absent from other relationships. Thus, if fiduciary law
principles are to be expanded into new areas of law, other solutions
must be found for the difficulties that will be encountered in doing
so. My argument proceeds as follows. In Part I, I explain the diffi-
culty of extending fiduciary law principles into new areas of law. I
start with a short primer on fiduciary law. I then elaborate on the
attraction of fiduciary law principles. Finally, I explain the difficulty
of extending them to new relationships and new areas of law. In
Part II, I provide a short primer on corporate law. I show how cor-
porate law presents a typical fiduciary situation, as well as how it
is idiosyncratic. I explain how the business judgment rule responds
to its circumstances, as well as the limits of the business judgment
rule—in particular, how it does not apply to conflict of interest
situations and how the corporate law model deals with conflicts. In
Part III, I argue that the corporate law model does not work in most
other contexts. I do so first in general principle, and then with
respect to the examples of friends, parents, and politicians. I con-
clude by addressing the limits of this Article. I am not arguing that
fiduciary law cannot be expanded or that a rule of deference is
always inappropriate. My argument is only that the business judg-
ment rule, properly understood, cannot be the basis for overcoming
the difficulties entailed in expanding fiduciary law indiscriminately
into new areas.
17. Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND.
L. REV. 83, 128 (2004).
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I. THE PROBLEM
This Part explores the concern that forms the basis for this
Article: the difficulty of extending fiduciary law principles into new
areas of law. Section A provides a short primer on fiduciary law.
Section B explains why fiduciary law principles are so attractive to
jurists. Section C explains why it is not so easy to extend fiduciary
law principles to new relationships and new areas of law. Section D
sets forth what advocates are looking for from fiduciary law: the
benefits of moral rhetoric and strong remedies without the draw-
backs of pervasive duties.
A. A Primer on Fiduciary Law
As previously mentioned, fiduciary law might better be under-
stood as a set of legal principles than as a separate area of law.18
These principles are implemented in other substantive areas of law.
Examples of areas of law that are heavily governed by fiduciary law
principles include trust law, agency law, corporate law, and pro-
fessional practice.19 Each implementation of fiduciary law is
arguably unique, adapting the general principles to meet the needs
of the specific context at hand.20 As a result, it is difficult to make
detailed claims about fiduciary law.21 Thus, some scholars have
expressed skepticism about whether fiduciary law can be adequately
defined.22
Nevertheless, the general principles that animate fiduciary law
are easily discernible. At the most general level,
[a] fiduciary relationship is a legally recognized relationship in
which one is [entrusted with] power over the interests of
18. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
19. Velasco, supra note 1, at 159-60.
20. Id. at 160.
21. Id.
22. See, e.g., Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation,
1988 DUKE L.J. 879, 915 (“One could justifiably conclude that the law of fiduciary obligation
is in significant respects atomistic.”); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 2, at 438 (“Scholars
... have had trouble coming up with a unifying approach to fiduciary duties because ... [t]here
is nothing special to find.”).
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another, who thereby becomes vulnerable to abuse. Although
such relationships are risky, they can also be very beneficial. In
order to encourage and police such relationships, the law
imposes a duty on the first party—the fiduciary—to act in the
interests of the second party—the beneficiary.... Thus, the raison
d’être of fiduciary duties ... is the protection of the beneficiary
from abuse at the hands of the fiduciary.23
The biggest issue in fiduciary law is determining which relation-
ships ought to be considered fiduciary in nature. Ideally, the law
would adopt a definitional approach. There would be a legal defi-
nition, and relationships that fall within the definition would be
deemed fiduciary, and those that do not would not. Unfortunately,
there is no such definition in the law.24 Legal scholars have proposed
various possibilities. One leading definition comes from Professor
Paul Miller’s fiduciary powers theory: “A fiduciary relationship is
one in which one party (the fiduciary) exercises discretionary power
over the significant practical interests of another (the benefi-
ciary).”25 Another comes from Professor D. Gordon Smith’s critical
resource theory: “[F]iduciary relationships form when one party (the
‘fiduciary’) acts on behalf of another party (the ‘beneficiary’) while
exercising discretion with respect to a critical resource belonging to
the beneficiary.”26
Although a definitional approach would be ideal, the law tends to
take a status-based approach.27 Under this approach, there is a
finite set of relationship types that have been deemed fiduciary in
nature.28 Other relationships generally are not considered fidu-
ciary.29 However, while courts tend to be reluctant to expand the
official canon, it is possible for new relationships to be added to the
23. Velasco, supra note 1, at 159 (footnote omitted).
24. See id. at 160-61.
25. See Paul B. Miller, The Fiduciary Relationship, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
FIDUCIARY LAW 63, 69 (Andrew S. Gold & Paul B. Miller eds., 2014).
26. See D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L.
REV. 1399, 1402 (2002) (emphasis omitted).
27. See Paul B. Miller, A Theory of Fiduciary Liability, 56 MCGILL L.J. 235, 241 (2011)
(“The status-based approach is the longest-standing and most widely used method of
identifying fiduciary relationships.”).
28. Id.
29. Id.
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list if they are sufficiently analogous to the established categories.30
In addition, courts sometimes find particular relationships that do
not fall within any of the recognized categories to be fiduciary on an
ad hoc basis.31 They do so when the facts indicate that a relationship
ought to be protected by fiduciary law principles.32 However, this ad
hoc approach is controversial.33
Once a relationship is deemed to be fiduciary, the law imposes a
special obligation on the fiduciary: a duty to act in the interests of
the beneficiary in all matters related to that relationship.34 In other
words, fiduciaries are obligated to behave in a self-denying man-
ner.35 This duty is often bifurcated into a duty of loyalty and a duty
of care, although other duties could be enumerated.36 Under the
duty of loyalty, a fiduciary is prohibited from acting counter to the
interests of the beneficiary.37 The principle is so important that it is
generally protected by prophylactic rules requiring the fiduciary to
avoid conflicts of interest.38 Under the duty of care, a fiduciary must
act diligently, exercising an appropriate level of care and skill.39 The
30. Id.
31. Daniel B. Kelly, Fiduciary Principles in Fact-Based Fiduciary Relationships, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 6, at 3, 6.
32. See id. at 10.
33. See id. at 10, 21-22.
34. See Velasco, supra note 13, at 648 (“Simply put, a fiduciary has the duty to act in the
interests of the beneficiary in all relevant respects.”); Paul B. Miller, Justifying Fiduciary
Duties, 58 MCGILL L.J. 969, 1014 (2013) (“Power is vested in fiduciaries to enable them to act
for, or on behalf of, beneficiaries, or to otherwise serve their interests. Fiduciary power is thus
a means by which to achieve the ends of beneficiaries.”).
35. Although it is often said that fiduciaries must act altruistically, such a claim probably
goes too far. Miller, supra note 34, at 995 & n.83. Similarly, it is often said that fiduciaries
must behave in an other-regarding manner, but such a claim probably does not go far enough.
Cf. Julian Velasco, Delimiting Fiduciary Status, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON FIDUCIARY LAW
76, 87-88 (D. Gordon Smith & Andrew S. Gold eds., 2018). Nearly all laws require actors to
behave in an other-regarding manner. Fiduciary law goes further to require fiduciaries to
deny their own interests with respect to the fiduciary relationship. See, e.g., Guth v. Loft, Inc.,
5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939).
36. See Julian Velasco, How Many Fiduciary Duties Are There in Corporate Law?, 83 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1231, 1232-33 (2010).
37. Id. at 1240 (citing Guth, 5 A.2d at 510).
38. More specifically, conflicts of interest and conflicts of duty. See Miller, supra note 34,
at 972 & n.4 (citing Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship: Its
Economic Character and Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045, 1054 (1991)).
39. Velasco, supra note 13, at 690-91.
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duty of care is not usually enforced with the same sort of prophylac-
tic rules as the duty of loyalty.40
Remedies in fiduciary law are “comprehensive and tenacious.”41
This stems from the fact that fiduciary law is situated in equity
rather than in law.42 As a result, breaches of fiduciary duty are not
limited to normal measures of damages.43 In addition to equitable
compensation, “a remedy that looks like damages,”44 there is also
available a panoply of more obviously equitable remedies. These
include injunctions, restitutionary remedies such as accounting for
profits, disgorgement, and constructive trusts, unwinding remedies
such as equitable rescission, and supervisory remedies such as
declaratory judgments.45
B. The Attraction
Fiduciary law principles are very attractive from an enforcement
perspective. This is especially so for two reasons: first, its use of
moral rhetoric, and second, its equitable remedies. Because these
characteristics would be desirable in many legal contexts, it is not
surprising that lawyers and legal scholars would be interested in
extending fiduciary law principles into new and disparate areas of
law.
Consider the prominence of moral rhetoric.46 From its inception,
fiduciary law is steeped in moral issues such as trust, vulnerability,
and abuse of power.47 Conceptually, it is difficult to justify violations
of trust, failure to protect the vulnerable, or any abuse of power. By
couching a relationship in these terms, fiduciary law grants the
40. See id. at 648-50.
41. Bray, supra note 6, at 449.
42. See id. at 450.
43. See id. at 456.
44. Id.
45. See generally id. at 449-61.
46. Cf. Leib, supra note 8, at 669 (“[T]he law of fiduciary duties ... gives courts a useful set
of rhetorical and analytical tools to employ when they are forced to entertain disputes that
arise between close friends.”).
47. See Miller, supra note 34, at 1010-11 (“The most commonly cited characteristics of
fiduciary relationships are discretion, power, inequality, dependence, vulnerability, trust, and
confidence.”).
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beneficiary plaintiff an enviable moral and rhetorical advantage
over the fiduciary defendant.
Moreover, courts deciding fiduciary law cases tend to embrace
morality and often play the role of preacher.48 In describing fidu-
ciary duties, they tend to use lofty language. Courts speak of “the
duty of the finest loyalty[,] ... [n]ot honesty alone, but the punctilio
of an honor the most sensitive,”49 the “demand[ ] of ... the most
scrupulous observance of his duty,” and the “require[ment of]
undivided and unselfish loyalty.”50 They insist that “thought of self
[is] to be renounced,”51 and that “precedence of self is compelled to
give way.”52 In terms of enforcement, they often speak of “[u]ncom-
promising rigidity.”53
What makes moral rhetoric so desirable? For one thing, it sug-
gests that the courts will be intolerant of violations.54 Perhaps more
importantly, it increases the likelihood that fiduciaries will conform
their behavior to the expectations of the law.55 From the perspective
of an advocate, whether a plaintiff ’s attorney or a sympathetic legal
scholar, characteristics such as these would be very welcome in
almost any area of law.
Next, consider equitable remedies. “Fiduciary remedies are ...
attractive to plaintiffs, who often seek to characterize their claims
48. Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44
UCLA L. REV. 1009, 1016 (1997) (“[W]e come much closer to understanding the role of courts
in corporate law if we think of judges more as preachers than as policemen.”).
49. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928).
50. Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939).
51. Meinhard, 164 N.E. at 548.
52. Guth, 5 A.2d at 510.
53. Meinhard, 164 N.E. at 546; see also Guth, 5 A.2d at 510 (describing the duty of loyalty
as “inveterate and uncompromising in its rigidity”).
54. See, e.g., Meinhard, 164 N.E. at 546 (“Uncompromising rigidity has been the attitude
of courts of equity when petitioned to undermine the rule of undivided loyalty by the
‘disintegrating erosion’ of particular exceptions. Only thus has the level of conduct for
fiduciaries been kept at a level higher than that trodden by the crowd. It will not consciously
be lowered by any judgment of this court.” (internal citation omitted)).
55. People often obey the law simply because it is law. See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE
OBEY THE LAW 170 (2006) (“People generally feel that existing legal authorities are legitimate,
and this legitimacy promotes compliance with the law.”); Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law
and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1253, 1270 (1999) (“[T]he general norm of obedience to
law ... is one of the most powerful norms of our society.”); cf. LYNN STOUT, CULTIVATING
CONSCIENCE:HOWGOODLAWSMAKE GOODPEOPLE 104-05 (2011) (“[S]ubjects cooperate when
an experimenter instructs them to cooperate ... [and] people change their behavior in social
dilemmas in response to mere hints about what the experimenter desires.”).
2021] FIDUCIARY JUDGMENT RULES 1407
as sounding in fiduciary law in order to take advantage of its
remedies.”56 What makes fiduciary remedies special? In actions at
law, monetary awards are generally limited to some sort of formula
that would make the plaintiff whole, whether this be measured by
losses incurred or by expectation interests.57 Such awards are also
available in equity, in the form of equitable compensation.58
However, equity also offers a very different type of monetary award
in the form of restitutionary remedies.59
Perhaps most importantly, fiduciaries are not permitted to retain
any secret profit that they make in connection with fiduciary
engagements. Rather, they must disgorge any such profits to their
beneficiaries.60 This is so even if the beneficiary was not harmed in
any way,61 and even if the beneficiary somehow benefited thereby.62
This is significant because, even in cases in which it may be difficult
or impossible to establish damages, the availability of disgorgement
can allow for a monetary award.63 Indeed, such an award can be
substantial.64
In addition to monetary awards, fiduciary law allows for other
types of remedies, such as injunctive and declaratory relief.65 Thus,
the court can fashion situation-specific remedies that are generally
unavailable in actions at law. Moreover, prevailing in even a non-
monetary way on a claim for breach of fiduciary duty may allow the
plaintiff to recover consequential damages, including the costs of
prosecuting the litigation.66
This combination of moral rhetoric and superior remedies makes
fiduciary law very attractive to plaintiffs’ attorneys and legal
56. Bray, supra note 6, at 449.
57. See, e.g., Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Disaggregating More-Than-Whole Damages in
Personal Injury Law: Deterrence and Punishment, 71 TENN. L. REV. 117, 119 (2003).
58. See Bray, supra note 6, at 456.
59. See id. at 451.
60. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 388 (AM. L. INST. 1933).
61. See Reading v. Att’y-Gen. [1951] AC 507 (HL) 514 (appeal taken from Eng.) (“It
matters not that the master has not lost any profit, nor suffered any damage.”).
62. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.05 cmt. b, illus. 1 (AM. L. INST. 2006).
63. Peter Jaffey, Restitutionary Damages and Disgorgement, 3 RESTITUTION L. REV. 30,
30 (1995).
64. See id.
65. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
66. See, e.g., Thorpe ex rel. Castleman v. CERBCO, Inc., 676 A.2d 436, 445 (Del. 1996);
Tarnowski v. Resop, 51 N.W.2d 801, 804 (Minn. 1952).
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scholars in other areas of law.67 It can lead to enhanced enforcement
of duty both by inducing greater compliance efforts as well as by
raising the cost of noncompliance. However, there are a few prob-
lems that prevent the wholesale adoption of fiduciary law principles
in other areas of law.
C. The Drawbacks
The moral rhetoric and equitable remedies of fiduciary law may
be attractive characteristics, but they do not come without a cost.
The central characteristic of fiduciary law is the existence of fiducia-
ry duties that are rigorous and pervasive.68 Simply put, a fiduciary
must pursue the interests of the beneficiary in all matters related
to the fiduciary relationship.69 Moreover, fiduciary duties are often
enforced strictly, with prophylactic rules intended to avoid even the
appearance of impropriety.70 Such a strict concept of duty works
fairly well in relationships that are inherently fiduciary in nature,
but they do not work so well in relationships that are not truly
fiduciary.71
One reason this is so is that it is unrealistic to demand that
people behave selflessly most of the time.72 People can be expected
to comply with laws and social mores, but they nevertheless should
be permitted to pursue their own interests throughout. Self-denial
can only be expected in limited circumstances. These circumstances
correspond well to classic fiduciary relationships. To expand the
domain of fiduciary law very liberally would be to impose a burden
that may be unbearable.
Moreover, in most relationships that are categorically deemed
fiduciary, the relationship is defined relatively narrowly. Trusts are
fiduciaries only with respect to the trust.73 Agents are fiduciaries
67. See Velasco, supra note 35, at 76.
68. See Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 10 (Del. 1998).
69. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
70. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
71. See Velasco, supra note 35, at 91-93.
72. See id. at 92-93.
73. See Edward Rock & Michael Wachter, Dangerous Liaisons: Corporate Law, Trust Law,
and Interdoctrinal Legal Transplants, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 651, 663-64 (2002).
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only with respect to the employment.74 Lawyers are fiduciaries only
with respect to the engagement.75 Rigorous and pervasive fiduciary
duties are manageable because of the limited scope of the relation-
ship.
The same cannot be said for many other relationships, some of
which are much more open-ended. Open-ended fiduciary duties are
problematic in open-ended relationships.76 At some point, they
become entirely unrealistic. Consider, for example, friendship.
Friendships have no obvious boundaries, and true friendships have
none. A pervasive and rigorous duty to pursue the interests of one’s
friends in all matters related to the friendship—which is to say, all
matters—would be overwhelming and unrealistic.77
Finally, at the heart of fiduciary law is the avoidance of
conflicts.78 When fiduciary relationships are limited and carefully
cabined, it is reasonable to expect fiduciaries to avoid such
conflicts.79 If fiduciary relationships were to be expanded greatly, it
might not even be possible to do so. Consider, for example, parents.
Parents are conflicted at all times.80 Every decision they make
requires a balancing of the child’s interests with those of their other
children as well as their own interests.81 This is true on every front,
including not only money but also time, attention, and discipline.82
There is almost no decision that a parent could make with respect
to a child that does not involve some sort of conflict of interest.83
Thus, a duty of loyalty simply cannot apply to such a relation-
ship—at least, not without significant dilution.
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. Cf. id. at 666 (“The corporate relationship is ... open ended in time and scope.... The
corporate director thus needs more flexibility to deal with evolving events.”). 
77. See Velasco, supra note 35, at 91-92.
78. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
79. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
80. See Velasco, supra note 35, at 93.
81. See id.
82. See id.
83. See id. (“Despite the rhetoric of ‘the best interests of the child,’ parenting is not as
selfless as might easily be imagined. Parents make many sacrifices for their children, but they
also refuse to make many others. The law could not be expected to require selflessness at all
times.”).
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D. The Desired Solution
It is clear that expanding fiduciary law principles into new areas
of law would be problematic. The moral rhetoric and the superior
remedies of fiduciary law are desirable, but the enforcement of per-
vasive and rigorous fiduciary duties would not be. Many would find
it desirable to find a way to get the benefits without the drawbacks.
In fact, there may be various ways to do so.
One possibility would be to apply fiduciary law principles in a
metaphorical matter. Although a relationship may not legally be
considered a fiduciary relationship, it may be described in terms
that sound essentially so. By making a connection between another
area of law and fiduciary law, legal scholars may be able to borrow
and incorporate its strong moral rhetoric without being encumber-
ed by its strict technical duties. This sort of thing happens all of the
time and is perfectly legitimate as long as it is acknowledged to be
metaphorical or at least normative and not accurately descriptive of
the law.84
However, such an approach would not give access to equitable
remedies.85 Moreover, metaphorical language is not in any way
binding on others. Each individual can accept or reject the metaphor
as they please. Thus, the moral rhetoric loses much of its force. As
a result, scholars often want to go beyond mere metaphor into
positive law. What would be preferable would be a way to adopt the
moral rhetoric in a binding way, but without being overly encum-
bered by fiduciary duties. Various scholars have concluded that
there is a way to do this. To do so, they look to one particular ver-
sion of fiduciary law: corporate law.86
Corporate law is notorious for its underenforcement of fiduciary
duties. This is especially evident in the doctrine known as the
business judgment rule. This doctrine will be discussed in more
detail in the next Part.87 In short, it operates to protect director
decisions from judicial review “in all but the most extreme cases.”88
84. Cf. supra Part I.B.
85. See supra notes 56-66 and accompanying text.
86. See, e.g., Leib, supra note 8; Scott & Scott, supra note 9; Rave, supra note 10.
87. See infra Part II.B.
88. See Velasco, supra note 13, at 649.
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As a practical matter, directors are almost never liable if the
business judgment rule applies.89
If as venerable a field of fiduciary law as corporate law can avoid
strict enforcement of fiduciary duties, then perhaps strict enforce-
ment is not central to fiduciary law after all. Perhaps the business
judgment rule can serve as a model for the expansion of fiduciary
law principles into other areas of law. For example, friendship
might be amenable to fiduciary law principles if there were also a
“friendship judgment rule” that would allow for under-enforcement
of fiduciary duties.90 Similarly, fiduciary law principles could be
applied to parenting if there were a “parental judgment rule” to the
same effect,91 and likewise to politicians if there were a “political
judgment rule.”92 In general, we could apply fiduciary principles
much more broadly if there were a general concept akin to the
business judgment rule, which could generically be called a
“fiduciary judgment rule,” that would shield new fiduciaries from
strict accountability for their discretionary decisions in open-ended
relationships.
However, the move does not work. It is based on an overly
simplistic and reductionist understanding of corporate law. In the
next Part, I will explain why the business judgment rule cannot
reasonably serve as the model for the expansion of fiduciary law into
other areas of law.
II. PRIMER ON CORPORATE LAW
This Part considers corporate law within the constellation of
fiduciary law. Corporate law is in some ways typical, and in some
ways idiosyncratic. It is typical in that it meets the standard
requirements for a classic fiduciary relationship and therefore re-
quires the protection of fiduciary duties.93 It is idiosyncratic in that
beneficiaries benefit from and actually prefer underenforcement of
89. See Julian Velasco, Fiduciary Principles in Corporate Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK
OF FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 6, at 61, 69.
90. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
91. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
92. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
93. See Velasco, supra note 89, at 61.
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those fiduciary duties.94 However, underenforcement in corporate
law extends only to duty of care issues, as to which directors are
considered trustworthy.95 When conflicts of interest are at stake, the
deference of the business judgment rule gives way to the more
rigorous fairness test.96 Nevertheless, when the conflict can be
eliminated, the benefits of the business judgment rule can be
restored.
A. Fiduciary Law Principles
Corporate law is one of the classic areas of law to which fiduciary
law principles apply. Shareholders are the owners of the business,
but often they are unable to manage it. This is especially true in
large public corporations, in which there are many thousands of
dispersed shareholders. Thus, shareholders hire expert managers
to run the business on their behalf.97 In doing so, shareholders
entrust the managers with power over their assets and become
vulnerable as a result.98 The managers are supposed to run the
business in the interests of the shareholders but may be tempted to
pursue their own interests instead.99 This makes “shareholders ...
vulnerable to abuse at the hands of [directors].”100 Thus, corporate
law fits the normal fiduciary law mold.
Corporate law gives directors extensive power over the corpora-
tion, mandating that “[t]he business and affairs of every corporation
... shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of direc-
tors.”101 However, directors are not free to do whatever they want.
The law imposes on them fiduciary duties towards “the corporation
and its shareholders.”102 Although directors can and indeed must
exercise their own independent business judgment, “[t]he board of
94. See id. at 62.
95. See id.
96. See id. at 66-67.
97. See id. at 61.
98. See id.
99. See id.
100. Id.
101. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2017).
102. See Velasco, supra note 89, at 64 (quoting Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493
A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985)).
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directors has the legal responsibility to manage the business of a
corporation for the benefit of its shareholder owners.”103
Fiduciary duties are pervasive in corporate law. According to the
Delaware Supreme Court, “fiduciary duty does not operate intermit-
tently but is the constant compass by which all director actions for
the corporation ... must be guided.”104 It is also all encompassing,
“demand[ing] of a corporate officer or director, peremptorily and
inexorably, the most scrupulous observance of his duty, not only
affirmatively to protect the interests of the corporation committed
to his charge, but also to refrain from doing anything that would
work injury to the corporation.”105
The two main fiduciary duties in corporate law are those of care
and of loyalty.106 The duty of care focuses on the decision-making
process: “[D]irectors have a duty to inform themselves ... of all
material information reasonably available to them. Having become
so informed, they must then act with requisite care in the discharge
of their duties.”107 The duty of loyalty focuses on conflicts of interest:
“Corporate officers and directors are not permitted to use their
position of trust and confidence to further their private interests....
The rule that requires an undivided and unselfish loyalty to the
corporation demands that there shall be no conflict between duty
and self-interest.”108 However, it is fair to say that the duty of care
and duty of loyalty are merely aspects of one overriding fiduciary
duty—to pursue the interests of the shareholders.109 “In other
words, the duty of care represents the concern that the directors
pursue the interests of the corporation and its shareholders
carefully[, while] the duty of loyalty represents the concern that
they do so loyally (without conflicts).”110 Other duties could be
specified, but discussion of the two main duties suffices for present
purposes.
103. Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 9 (Del. 1998).
104. Id. at 10.
105. Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939).
106. See Velasco, supra note 36, at 1231.
107. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
108. Guth, 5 A.2d at 510.
109. See Velasco, supra note 13, at 648; see also Velasco, supra note 36, at 1281-84.
110. Velasco, supra note 36, at 1301.
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In these respects, corporate law represents a very typical
fiduciary situation. In other respects, however, corporate law is idio-
syncratic. These are considered in the next Section.
B. Idiosyncrasy and the Business Judgment Rule
Perhaps the most obvious way in which corporate law differs from
other applications of fiduciary law is in the business judgment rule.
“The business judgment rule is ... a presumption that in making a
business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed
basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken
was in the best interests of the company.”111 Under this doctrine, a
business decision will be upheld if it “can be attributed to any
rational business purpose.”112 Some have called the business
judgment rule an abstention doctrine.113 Others insist that Delaware
courts are more interested in preaching the moral rhetoric than
enforcing any legal duties.114 Lay persons may be forgiven for
concluding that corporate law simply does not enforce fiduciary
duties, and that directors can get away with pretty much anything.
Even corporate legal scholars sometimes interpret the business
judgment rule in this way.115 At first glance, it might seem to
suggest that fiduciary duties simply are not very important in
corporate law. However, this is incorrect.
It is well known that the business judgment rule is a core doctrine
in corporate law,116 but it is not well understood that the business
111. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812.
112. Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971).
113. See generally Bainbridge, supra note 17.
114. See, e.g., Rock, supra note 48, at 1016 (“[W]e come much closer to understanding the
role of courts in corporate law if we think of judges more as preachers than as policemen.”). 
115. See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 733, 770-72 (2005) (“[C]ourts are extraordinarily willing to sustain decisions that
apparently sacrifice profits (at least in the short run) ... as long as [they have] some
conceivable relationship, however tenuous, to long run profitability ... [which] such a
relationship can almost always be conceived.” (footnote omitted)); David L. Engel, An
Approach to Corporate Social Responsibility, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1, 16-17 (1979) (“As a practical
matter, the business judgment defense is unlikely to fail in the absence of conflicts of interest,
extraordinary amounts of profit foregone, or some other affirmative suggestion of bad faith.
And all this is no less true because the defense is disingenuous.” (footnote omitted)).
116. To be more precise, the managerial authority of the board of directors on which the
business judgment rule is based is considered by the courts to be a core principle. See, e.g., CA,
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judgment rule actually serves the purposes of fiduciary law in
corporate law’s special circumstances. To suggest that the business
judgment rule reflects a policy of non-enforcement is overly
simplistic. In fact, it reflects a reasoned policy of prudential under-
enforcement.117
Although Delaware defines the business judgment rule as a
presumption, it might better be understood as a standard of re-
view.118 In fact, the business judgment rule comprises two standards
of review. As to the actual substance of business decisions, the
standard of review is waste or irrationality, which is almost
insurmountable.119 Thus, it is fair, if not quite perfectly accurate, to
say that the business judgment rule operates as a policy of non-
review as to such matters.120 However, as to the decision-making
process, the standard of review is gross negligence.121 This is also a
high hurdle for plaintiffs, but it is not insurmountable.122
However, deferential does not mean that directors are only
required to refrain from waste and gross negligence. The courts are
clear that directors must exercise “that amount of care which
ordinarily careful and prudent men would use in similar circum-
stances.”123 What explains this discrepancy? Corporate law is
Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 232 n.7 (Del. 2008) (“[T]he board’s
managerial authority under Section 141(a) is a cardinal precept of the [Delaware General
Corporation Law].”); McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 916 (Del. 2000) (“One of the
fundamental principles of the Delaware General Corporation Law statute is that the business
affairs of a corporation are managed by or under the direction of its board of directors.”);
Quickturn Design Sys., Inc. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281, 1291 (Del. 1998) (“One of the most
basic tenets of Delaware corporate law is that the board of directors has the ultimate
responsibility for managing the business and affairs of a corporation.”).
117. See Julian Velasco, The Role of Aspiration in Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 54 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 519, 546-53, 571-80 (2012).
118. See Velasco, supra note 36, at 1238.
119. See id. at 1252-56 (discussing the waste standard).
120. See, e.g., William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs & Leo E. Strine, Jr., Function over Form:
A Reassessment of Standards of Review in Delaware Corporation Law, 56 BUS. LAW. 1287,
1297 (2001) (“[The business judgment rule] is an expression of a policy of non-review.”);
Lyman Johnson, The Modest Business Judgment Rule, 55 BUS. LAW. 625, 625 (2000) (“The
business judgment rule ... is better understood as a ... policy of non-review.”); see also
Bainbridge, supra note 17, at 89-90 (“Alternatively, ... the business judgment rule can be seen
as an abstention doctrine.”).
121. See Velasco, supra note 36, at 1237-39 (discussing the gross negligence standard).
122. See id.
123. Graham ex rel. S’holders of Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188
A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963).
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characterized by a divergence between standards of conduct and
standards of review.124 The law requires directors to act with a
relatively high standard of conduct—ordinary care125—but will only
hold them liable for falling below a relatively low standard of
review—for example, gross negligence.126
The legal basis for the business judgment rule is said to be a
statutory command.127 According to the Delaware General Corpora-
tion Law, “[t]he business and affairs of every corporation ... shall be
managed by or under the direction of a board of directors.”128 Thus,
it is the directors, rather than the shareholders or the courts, who
should be making business decisions.129 But why?
Many different justifications for the business judgment rule have
been proposed. Because these justifications are well known to any-
one familiar with corporate law, I will not go into them in much
detail. Rather, I will briefly list the various justifications and argue
that they have one important characteristic in common.
There are institutional choice arguments for the business judg-
ment rule. It is often noted that courts are not business experts.130
Therefore, they should not be second-guessing the decisions of
124. See generally Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and
Standards of Review in Corporate Law, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 437 (1993).
125. See Graham, 188 A.2d at 130.
126. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (“[U]nder the business judgment rule
director liability is predicated upon concepts of gross negligence.”).
127. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) (“Under Delaware law, the
business judgment rule is the offspring of the fundamental principle, codified in [Delaware
General Corporation Law section] 141(a), that the business and affairs of a Delaware
corporation are managed by or under its board of directors.”). 
128. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2017).
129. See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872 (“The business judgment rule exists to protect and
promote the full and free exercise of the managerial power granted to Delaware directors.”);
see also Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1000 (N.Y. 1979) (“[B]y definition the
responsibility for business judgments must rest with the corporate directors; their individual
capabilities and experience peculiarly qualify them for the discharge of that responsibility.”).
130. See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 263 (Del. 2000) (“Courts are ill-fitted to attempt
to weigh the ‘adequacy’ of consideration under the waste standard or, ex post, to judge
appropriate degrees of business risk.” (quoting Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 336 (Del.
Ch. 1997))); Cuker v. Mikalauskas, 692 A.2d 1042, 1046 (Pa. 1997) (“[The business judgment]
doctrine prevents courts from becoming enmeshed in complex corporate decision-making, a
task they are ill-equipped to perform.”); Auerbach, 393 N.E.2d at 1000 (“[T]he business
judgment doctrine, at least in part, is grounded in the prudent recognition that courts are ill
equipped and infrequently called on to evaluate what are and must be essentially business
judgments.”).
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directors.131 This is especially true because of the phenomenon of
hindsight bias.132 Thus, judicial interventions are likely to be sub-
optimal.
There are arguments based on risk. Business decisions are
inherently risky: in order to generate wealth, corporations must be
willing to take on appropriate entrepreneurial risks.133 Shareholders
willingly accept that risk.134 They do so by choosing to buy stock in
the corporation,135 by deciding whether to diversify their invest-
ments,136 and by electing the directors who will be making the risky
decisions.137 Shareholders should be permitted to take on risk, which
includes both upside and downside potential.
Relatedly, there are liability concerns. Directors are inherently
more risk averse than shareholders because they have more at
stake—their jobs. If they were also exposed to the risk of being held
personally liable for bad business decisions, they would be even less
willing to take on business risks.138 In fact, the potential for
131. See Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1982) (“[C]ourts recognize that after-the-
fact litigation is a most imperfect device to evaluate corporate business decisions.”).
132. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65
U. CHI. L. REV. 571, 619-23 (1998).
133. See, e.g., Joy, 692 F.2d at 886.
134. See id. at 885 (“[S]hareholders to a very real degree voluntarily undertake the risk of
bad business judgment. Investors need not buy stock, for investment markets offer an array
of opportunities less vulnerable to mistakes in judgment by corporate officers.”); Gagliardi v.
TriFoods Int’l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1052 (Del. Ch. 1996) (“Shareholders don’t want (or
shouldn’t rationally want) directors to be risk averse. Shareholders’ investment interests ...
will be maximized if corporate directors and managers honestly assess risk and reward and
accept for the corporation the highest risk adjusted returns available that are above the firm’s
cost of capital.”).
135. Joy, 692 F.2d at 885 (“Since shareholders can and do select among investments partly
on the basis of management, the business judgment rule merely recognizes a certain
voluntariness in undertaking the risk of bad business decisions.”). 
136. See id. at 886 (“Shareholders can reduce the volatility of risk by diversifying their
holdings.... Given mutual funds and similar forms of diversified investment, courts need not
bend over backwards to give special protection to shareholders who refuse to reduce the
volatility of risk by not diversifying.” (footnote omitted)); Gagliardi, 683 A.2d at 1052
(“Shareholders can diversify the risks of their corporate investments.”).
137. Cf. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 968 (Del. Ch. 1996) (“If
the shareholders thought themselves entitled to some other quality of judgment than such a
director produces in the good faith exercise of the powers of office, then the shareholders
should have elected other directors.”).
138. See id. at 968 n.16 (“If those in charge of the corporation are to be adjudged personally
liable for losses ... based upon what ... persons of ordinary or average judgment ... regard as
‘prudent[,]’ ‘sensible[,]’ or even ‘rational[,]’ such persons will have a strong incentive at the
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crushing liability139 could dissuade many competent people from
being willing to serve as directors at all.140 However, protecting
directors from liability would increase their willingness to serve141
and to take on appropriate business risks, as the shareholders
desire.142
There are also arguments based on trust. As a general matter,
director interests are aligned with shareholder interests.143 Thus,
courts need not police directors very closely. Deferential review
allows courts to conserve judicial resources in most cases and focus
attention on cases in which directors cannot be trusted because they
have conflicts of interest.144
Finally, it has been argued that judicial review is not as necessary
in the business context because various market forces provide
accountability for directors’ decisions.145
margin to authorize less risky investment projects.”).
139. See Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Once More, the Business Judgment Rule, 2000 WIS. L. REV.
573, 575 (“In most cases, liability for negligence operates to shift the loss from a single human
victim and spread it ... across a larger, more diversified group.... Imposing liability on the
directors serves to re-concentrate [a] loss on a small handful of individuals.”).
140. See Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l v. UAL Corp., 717 F. Supp. 575, 582 (N.D. Ill. 1989)
(“It would be considerably more difficult to recruit directors to serve on corporate boards if
their business decisions were subject to substantive scrutiny.”), aff’d, 897 F.2d 1394 (7th Cir.
1990).
141. See id. (“The business judgment rule encourages competent individuals to become
directors who otherwise might decline for fear of personal liability.”).
142. See Velasco, supra note 117, at 546-53 (discussing the room-for-error theory).
143. See Allen et al., supra note 120, at 1302 (“[A] board that is not conflicted is motivated
to achieve the highest transaction price the market will permit. Because in those
circumstances the board’s interests and the interests of the shareholders are aligned, there
is no reason for courts to engage in a substantive review of the board’s decision.”); Henry G.
Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110, 117 (1965)
(“Generally speaking, managers’ incentives and interests coincide with those of their
shareholders in every particular except one: they have no incentive, as managers, to buy
management services for the company at the lowest possible price.”).
144. See Velasco, supra note 13, at 654-55.
145. See Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A Response
to the Anti-contractarians, 65 WASH.L.REV. 1, 18-32 (1990) (discussing various market forces
that constrain management conduct); Jonathan R. Macey, Private Trusts for the Provision of
Private Goods, 37 EMORY L.J. 295, 315 (1988) (“Competition in capital markets, product
markets, and the market for corporate control all induce managers and directors of public
corporations to act in ways consonant with shareholder welfare.”); Robert B. Thompson, The
Law’s Limits on Contracts in a Corporation, 15 J. CORP. L. 377, 380-82 (1990) (describing
various market forces that constrain management); Charles M. Elson & Robert B. Thompson,
Van Gorkom’s Legacy: The Limits of Judicially Enforced Constraints and the Promise of
Proprietary Incentives, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 579, 581 (2002) (“Product markets indirectly
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Although these justifications seem fairly disparate, there is one
thing that they have in common: they all redound to the benefit of
the shareholders. In other words, properly understood, the business
judgment rule does not exist for the benefit of the directors or the
courts, but rather for the benefit of shareholders. Deferential review
reflects a prudential judgment regarding the costs and benefits to
shareholders of enforcement of breach of fiduciary duty. Given the
limitations of the judiciary, shareholders do not want to rely too
much on judicial interventions.146 Moreover, given the risk aversion
of directors, strict enforcement would be harmful to the share-
holders’ interests.147 Thus, the law has settled on a policy of under-
enforcement for the benefit of shareholders.148 That directors and
courts may also benefit from underenforcement is entirely inciden-
tal.
It may seem fanciful to assert that shareholders actually prefer
deferential review of directors’ actions. However, there is strong
evidence to support this view. In 1985, in the notorious case of
Smith v. Van Gorkom, the Delaware Supreme Court held the
directors liable for breach of the duty of care—notwithstanding the
business judgment rule—finding that they were grossly negligent in
approving a merger.149 There was widespread agreement among
commentators that the circumstances did not amount to gross
negligence, and some thought they did not even amount to ordinary
negligence.150 This specter of newfound liability caused a panic, as
constrain managers’ decisions, as do the capital market, the market for managerial services,
and the market for corporate control.”).
146. See Velasco, supra note 89, at 70.
147. See id.
148. See id. (“After an implicit cost-benefit analysis, corporate law has come to the
conclusion that shareholder interests are advanced best by underenforcement of the duty of
care.”).
149. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 874, 893 (Del. 1985); see also WILLIAM T. ALLEN,
REINIER KRAAKMAN & GUHAN SUBRAMANIAN, COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF
BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 234 (4th ed. 2012) (“Van Gorkom was the first Delaware case to
actually hold directors liable for breach of the duty of care in a case in which the board had
made a business decision.”).
150. See, e.g., William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs & Leo E. Strine, Jr., Realigning the
Standard of Review of Director Due Care with Delaware Public Policy: A Critique of Van
Gorkom and Its Progeny as a Standard of Review Problem, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 449, 458 (2002)
(“These failures of process may well have constituted ordinary negligence (though some
observers dispute even that), but it is difficult to argue that those failures constituted true
gross negligence.”); William T. Quillen, Trans Union, Business Judgment, and Neutral
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people questioned whether insurance companies would be willing to
provide coverage to directors151 and, as a result, whether directors
would be willing to continue to serve.152 Therefore, states passed
laws known as “exculpation statutes” that allowed for the limitation
or elimination of monetary liability for breach of the duty of care.153
Delaware’s statute has an opt-in provision, requiring shareholder
approval.154 Shareholders nearly universally adopted charter pro-
visions eliminating liability for breach of the duty of care; moreover,
there has been no significant push to repeal such provisions, even
as shareholder activism has increased significantly since the
adoption of such provisions.155 Thus, the claim that shareholders
prefer deferential review seems not only plausible but actually
correct.
It is worth noting one theoretically possible justification that is
not generally offered in defense of the business judgment rule. It is
not maintained that the judicial deference is appropriate because of
a lack of concern with breach of fiduciary duty.156 Rather, deference
reflects a deliberate decision to advance the interests of the
shareholders.157 Those interests are best advanced not by strict
Principles, 10 DEL. J. CORP. L. 465, 498 (1985) (“[W]hatever anyone thinks of the directors’
activity in [Van Gorkom], most commentators have not viewed the activity as grossly
negligent.”).
151. See Roberta Romano, Corporate Governance in the Aftermath of the Insurance Crisis,
39 EMORY L.J. 1155, 1160 (1990) (“Delaware hoped to ease the insurance crisis by eliminating
liability relating to duties typically covered by [directors and officers] insurance.”).
152. See Roberta Romano, What Went Wrong with Directors’ and Officers’ Liability
Insurance?, 14 DEL.J.CORP.L. 1, 1-2 (1989) (“There are reports of directors resigning because
their firms had lost insurance coverage and of individuals declining invitations to serve on
boards in increasing numbers.”).
153. Different states have authorized exculpation provisions in different ways. See
generally MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 2.02 cmts. 6-7, at 2-34 to -42 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013)
(comparing exculpation provisions across states); 2 WILLIAM E. KNEPPER & DAN A. BAILEY,
LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS § 16.01-.08, at 16-1 to -24 (8th ed. 2019)
(discussing history of exculpation provisions). 
154. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2017).
155. Rock & Wachter, supra note 73, at 659-60.
156. See Velasco, supra note 13, at 654 (“[T]he business judgment rule does not exist
because the duty of care is undervalued. At least, judges never express any such sentiment.
To the contrary, they often opine on the importance of director diligence.” (footnote omitted));
see also Velasco, supra note 117, at 539 (“Neither scholars nor courts argue that fiduciary
duties are relatively unimportant and unworthy of additional enforcement.”).
157. See Velasco, supra note 89, at 63 (“[I]t is not the case that fiduciary duty is
unimportant in corporate law. Rather, the law is balancing general fiduciary law principles
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enforcement of fiduciary duties but by a more deferential policy of
underenforcement.
C. Conflicts of Interest in Corporate Law
The previous Section does not tell the whole story. It is fair to say
that the business judgment rule applies primarily to claims of
breach of the duty of care. In those cases, underenforcement is the
appropriate policy because both the trust and risk rationales
suggest that strict enforcement is unnecessary.158 However, this is
not true with respect to claims of breach of duty of loyalty. When
directors face conflicts of interest, they are not as trustworthy.159 In
addition, the risk of self-dealing outweighs any concern about risk
aversion.160 Thus, “[t]he ‘business judgment rule’ ... yields to the rule
of undivided loyalty.”161
When confronting loyalty issues, corporate law takes a very
different approach. By default, the courts subject director decisions
to review under the fairness test: “[T]he burden is on the director ...
not only to prove the good faith of the transaction but also to show
its inherent fairness from the viewpoint of the corporation and those
interested therein.”162 This is a far cry from the deference of the
business judgment rule.
However, conflicts do not necessarily lead to the invocation of the
fairness test. Rather, corporate law has come to accept an alterna-
tive solution to the problem of conflicting interests: approval by
unconflicted decision makers.163 Notwithstanding a director conflict,
a transaction or decision will be subject to review under the
business judgment rule instead of the fairness test if it is approved
by a vote of fully informed, disinterested, and independent directors
with practical considerations concerning the profit motive in order to achieve the best overall
result for the shareholders.”).
158. See Velasco, supra note 36, at 1239.
159. See id. at 1240.
160. See id. at 1242.
161. Bayer v. Beran, 49 N.Y.S.2d 2, 6 (Sup. Ct. 1944); see also Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503,
510 (Del. 1939) (“The rule that requires an undivided and unselfish loyalty to the corporation
demands that there shall be no conflict between duty and self-interest.”).
162. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306 (1939). See generally Velasco, supra note 36, at
1239-44.
163. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a) (2017).
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or shareholders.164 In theory, such approval eliminates the conflict
altogether because it causes the decision to be made by unconflicted
parties. Unconflicted directors themselves are an obvious alterna-
tive, because directors are the appropriate decision makers for the
corporation and conflicted directors are simply excluded from the
relevant vote. Unconflicted shareholders are not quite as obvious
because shareholders are not the ordinary decision makers for the
corporation. However, shareholders are the owners of the corpora-
tion, and they also elect the directors, so it is entirely fitting and
proper that they should be able to essentially waive the conflict by
approving the transaction or decision.
In short, the deference of the business judgment rule has little
applicability when the duty of loyalty is at stake. Instead, the more
rigorous fairness test applies. However, if the conflict of interests
can be eliminated effectively, then corporate law is willing to
provide the protection of the business judgment rule after all.
III. FIDUCIARY WANNABES
This Part will argue that the corporate law model does not work
in the context of most other relationships and areas of law. Section
A explains why this is so in general principle. Section B considers
the corporate law model in the context of three specific examples:
friends, parents, and politicians.
A. Corporate Law Model Does Not Work
The heart of fiduciary law is the beneficiary.165 Fiduciary law
exists to validate the trust that the beneficiary must have in the
fiduciary.166 Fiduciary duties are imposed to prevent abuse of the
beneficiary at the hands of the fiduciary.167 The fiduciary is required
to pursue the interests of the beneficiary in all respects relevant to
164. See Velasco, supra note 36, at 1241 & n.34. However, if the conflicted party is a
controlling shareholder, then it would require the approval of the fully informed,
disinterested, and independent directors and shareholders to invoke the business judgment
rule. See Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 645-46 (Del. 2014).
165. See Velasco, supra note 1, at 159.
166. See id.
167. See id.
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the relationship.168 Thus, fiduciary law requires the fiduciary to
engage in self-denial: a fiduciary may not pursue his own interests,
but must subordinate them to those of the beneficiary.169
It is safe to assume that beneficiaries generally want and ap-
preciate the protections of fiduciary law. After all, they are in a
structurally vulnerable position.170 As a general matter, beneficia-
ries may well trust their fiduciaries, but the former nevertheless
would want the option of legal redress should the latter prove to be
unfaithful.
Moreover, in classic fiduciary contexts, strict enforcement is a real
possibility. Because fiduciaries use powers that do not naturally
belong to themselves but rather belong to the beneficiaries, the law
can require self-denial as a matter of both legitimacy and practical-
ity.171 Although reasonable people can disagree on whether it is
ideal to do so, there is no doubt that it is workable.
In most nonfiduciary relationships, fiduciary duties that require
such self-denial would not work very well. First, such duties would
lack legitimacy. In modern society, people expect to be able to
pursue their own interests freely, provided only that they comply
with restrictions imposed by law.172 Second, it would be impractical
to enforce fiduciary duties. Even a pervasive duty of care would be
theoretically problematic, although it might be workable. However,
a rigorous duty of loyalty would not be realistically possible. We
understand, accept, and expect that people generally pursue their
own interests. Although they may sometimes act in an other-
regarding manner, they rarely engage in self-denial and cannot be
expected to do so. Moreover, the duty of loyalty prohibits not only
actual abuse but even any conflicts of interest.173 It would be more
or less impossible to enforce a prohibition against conflicts of
interest in many if not most relationships.
For these reasons, fiduciary law should be carefully cabined.
Fiduciary duties ought not to be imposed where they would not
work.
168. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
170. See Velasco, supra note 1, at 161.
171. See Velasco, supra note 13, at 697 & n.302.
172. See, e.g., TYLER, supra note 55, at 170.
173. See Miller, supra note 34, at 972 & n.4.
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Some may argue that corporate law is a fiduciary relationship in
which fiduciary duties are not strictly enforced. Thus, perhaps
relationships can be considered fiduciary even when strict enforce-
ment of fiduciary duties is inappropriate. It would seem that strict
enforcement is not a necessary aspect of fiduciary law.
This argument falls short for various reasons. First, strict
enforcement would be possible in corporate law. In fact, a strict
prohibition of conflicts of interest was once in place.174 My argument
is that if fiduciary law could not work, then it does not fit and
should not be imposed.
Second, although corporate law does underenforce fiduciary
duties, it does so for reasons that are entirely consistent with the
purposes of fiduciary law. As previously discussed, under-enforce-
ment does not exist to protect the fiduciary, but rather to advance
the interests of the shareholders.175 On care issues, shareholders
actually desire the underenforcement in order to incentivize risk-
averse managers.176 On loyalty issues, however, there is much less
under-enforcement; because directors cannot be trusted, they are
subject to much more rigorous judicial review.177 Thus, although
corporate law implements fiduciary law in a unique way, it does so
not only consistently with the basic purposes of fiduciary law but
actually in furtherance thereof.
As a result, corporate law is not the appropriate model for the
expansion of fiduciary law principles into new areas of law. In most
relationships that are not classically fiduciary in nature, fiduciary
duties would not work and, indeed, would be somewhat illegiti-
mate.178 However, it is not the case that the beneficiaries would not
174. See Harold Marsh, Jr., Are Directors Trustees? Conflict of Interest and Corporate
Morality, 22 BUS. LAW. 35, 36 (1966) (“In 1880 it could have been stated with confidence that
in the United States the general rule was that any contract between a director and his
corporation was voidable at the instance of the corporation or its shareholders, without regard
to the fairness or unfairness of the transaction.”).
175. See supra Part II.B.
176. See supra notes 133-37 and accompanying text.
177. See, e.g., Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1376 (Del. 1993).
178. Cf. Velasco, supra note 35, at 77 (“Excessive expansion of fiduciary law presents
myriad problems. Most obviously, the imposition of severe duties and extreme remedies upon
unexpecting and undeserving parties is problematic and unfair. A less obvious, but
nevertheless important, concern is the likelihood that aggressive expansion of the scope of
fiduciary law may lead to its diminution.”).
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want the protections. Likely they would—at least as beneficiaries.179
Rather, it is the fiduciary who would object to the imposition of
fiduciary duties, and the rest of society—including, perhaps, the
beneficiaries as potential fiduciaries in other relationships—who
would agree.180 Under such circumstances, the nonenforcement of
fiduciary duties would not be in furtherance of the interests of the
beneficiary. Rather, it would be based on a policy decision that runs
counter to the interests of the beneficiary.181 This makes it an
inappropriate endeavor: an attempt to avoid fiduciary law principles
for nonfiduciary law reasons.
In other words, a fiduciary judgment rule modeled on the
business judgment rule would amount to little more than a legal
gimmick: a way to take the desired advantages of fiduciary law
without accepting the undesirable ramifications. Such a ploy should
not be permitted to succeed. If a relationship cannot bear the weight
of fiduciary law, then it should not be considered a candidate for its
expansion.
Moreover, a fiduciary judgment rule based on the business
judgment rule often would be radically insufficient to allow the
application of fiduciary law principles into new relationships. This
is because the judicial deference of the business judgment rule
applies only to care issues.182 However, the more serious problems
with an expansive fiduciary law lie in the duty of loyalty and the
prohibition of conflicts of interest. As to these matters, the business
judgment rule provides little to no protection, and thus neither
would a broader fiduciary judgment rule modeled after it.
To be fair, corporate law does provide ways for conflicted transac-
tions to avoid the rigorous judicial review of the fairness test. If
conflicted transactions are approved by fully informed and disinter-
ested directors or shareholders, then the protections of the business
judgment rule can be reclaimed.183 However, it is important to note
that such a move is, in a very real sense, the elimination of the
conflict of interest: the relevant decision is made by unconflicted
179. See id. at 76.
180. See id. at 77.
181. Cf. supra Part II.B.
182. See supra Part II.C.
183. See supra notes 163-64 and accompanying text.
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parties.184 Moreover, such decisions are not being made by unrelated
unconflicted parties, but by legitimate decision makers: either other
fiduciaries or the beneficiaries. In corporations, this means either
unconflicted directors, who are the most appropriate decision
makers, or shareholders, whose approval could be considered a
waiver.185
In many other relationships, there would be no analogous
decision makers through whom it could be said that the conflict of
interest has been negated.186 Of course, third-party decision makers
are available, and the courts are the most obvious example.
However, other third-party decision makers generally would not
have the kind of inherent legitimacy that directors and sharehold-
ers do. Thus, corporate law does not provide a sufficient model for
the expansion of fiduciary law principles into areas in which it does
not naturally belong.
B. Examples
This Section will consider in more depth three types of relation-
ships that legal scholars have suggested should be considered
fiduciary relationships: friends, parents, and politicians. I do not
consider the question of whether such relationships ought to be
considered fiduciary as a moral matter or on policy grounds. Rather,
I seek to show that they ought not to be considered fiduciary
relationships because fiduciary law could not practically be applied
to them generally. I also argue that the business judgment rule,
properly understood, does not provide the kind of help that would be
necessary to make it work.
1. Friends
Ethan Leib has argued that friendship should be considered a
fiduciary relationship.187 He demonstrates that some courts have
184. See supra notes 163-64 and accompanying text.
185. See supra Part II.C.
186. See supra notes 163-64 and accompanying text; infra notes 216-17, 250-51 and
accompanying text.
187. See Leib, supra note 8.
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considered it so, and then argues that this is appropriate.188
However, in order to make it work, he must resort to a “friendship
judgment rule.”189
The basic fiduciary duty is that a fiduciary must pursue the
interests of the beneficiary in all matters related to the rela-
tionship.190 Clearly, this rule taken seriously could not be applied to
friendships. The friendship relationship is simply too broad.191 There
is little to nothing that lies outside of its scope.192 Thus, fiduciary
law principles potentially would require friends to pursue each
other’s interests in nearly all matters. It would be possible to cabin
the duty to allow friends to pursue their mutual benefit, rather than
exclusively the other’s benefit, as in the case of partnerships.
However, even so it would remain unworkable in friendships. People
cannot be expected to put their individual or even selfish interests
to the side very often.193 Therefore, it would be necessary to find a
way to limit the scope of fiduciary duty.
Consider the duty of care as applied to friendship. Friends would
have a duty to monitor each other to be aware of each other’s needs
and a duty to use reasonable efforts to assist.194 Whether such
assistance would have to be material and financial or simply
emotional, it would still be quite a burden. Consider next the duty
of loyalty. A friend would not be able to do anything that would
cause harm to the friend or the friendship.195 Moreover, in order to
comply with the duty of loyalty, friends would have to avoid conflicts
of interest.196 This would be unmanageable. Friends perpetually
have conflicts in their lives, whether for oneself or for another
friend; they simply manage to deal with them.197 But fiduciary law
188. See id.
189. See id. at 709.
190. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
191. See Velasco, supra note 35, at 92-93.
192. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
193. See Velasco, supra note 35, at 92.
194. Cf. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (“[D]irectors have a duty to inform
themselves ... of all material information reasonably available to them. Having become so
informed, they must then act with requisite care in the discharge of their duties.”).
195. See Miller, supra note 34, at 972.
196. See id.
197. See Velasco, supra note 35, at 92.
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prohibits conflicts, or at least regulates them.198 Thus, fiduciary
duties do not work well in the context of friendship.
There might be ways to limit the impact of fiduciary law princi-
ples. For example, it could be held that only close friends are
fiduciaries.199 Setting aside the difficulty of defining the closeness of
friends,200 this still seems inadequate. Presumably, most people
have multiple close friends, and therefore the burdens and conflicts
would remain high. Even if it were limited to best friends, we might
mitigate the care issues but not the loyalty issues. It is virtually
impossible, even for a mutually exclusive friendship, not to involve
conflicts of interest.201 Friendship involves generosity, and generos-
ity necessarily involves conflicts of interest—in the decision of
whether to be generous or selfish on any particular matter.
Another possible solution would be to limit the scope of friendship
to financial matters. This would greatly alleviate the burdens and
conflicts because issues involving only time and affection would no
longer be litigable. However, it would also be an extremely arbitrary
limit that undermines the very concept of friendship. Friendships
are rarely, or at most only incidentally, about money.202 To limit
fiduciary duties in friendship to financial matters suggests that the
true goal is not to make friendships fiduciary relationships but
rather to make friendship a factor in considering whether to make
another financial relationship a fiduciary one. This seems to be
what Professor Leib was really trying to do.203 However, to the
extent that the friendship factor is heavily weighted, the problems
remain; to the extent that it is weighted lightly, it becomes less
meaningful.
198. See supra notes 163-64, 173 and accompanying text.
199. See Leib, supra note 8, at 708; cf. Del. Cnty. Emps. Ret. Fund v. Sanchez, 124 A.3d
1017, 1023 (Del. 2015) (close friendship of fifty years).
200. See Velasco, supra note 35, at 91.
201. See id. at 92.
202. Cf. Julian Velasco, Structural Bias and the Need for Substantive Review, 82 WASH. U.
L.Q. 821, 859 (2004) (“Surely there are many things that one would not do for money that one
might nevertheless do for a friend.”).
203. Cf. Leib, supra note 8, at 704 (“Although most courts will concede that a friendship
alone cannot trigger the responsibilities of a fiduciary relation, some will still acknowledge
that friendship ‘is often an important consideration and undoubtedly furnishes a vantage
ground for one is not likely to expect a friend to deceive him into a bad bargain.’” (emphasis
omitted) (quoting Meginnes v. McChesney, 160 N.W. 50, 52 (Iowa 1916))).
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Either way, the boundaries would be difficult to establish with
any degree of certainty. Leib’s own example illustrates the point: he
suggests that a shared dream of establishing “an environmentally
friendly beverage company in China” should somehow limit the
ability of one friend to pursue such a business without the other.204
According to Leib’s view, fiduciary duty should prevent this even
though “neither [friend] had suggested to the other that their
business idea was confidential,” and even though no “theft claim or
intellectual property claim could be sustained.”205 However, the law
does not protect such ideas for good reason: it is generally the
execution rather than the idea that adds value. To allow discussions
among friends to unsettle legal expectations in this way could have
very far-reaching consequences.206 If this were settled law, it is
likely that such friends would appear in very many circumstances,
and the friendship exception could easily undermine many a general
rule of law.207
Leib offers other ways to limit the severity of his proposal: the
adoption of a “friendship judgment rule,” which would “defer[ ] to
the judgment of friends unless departures from good behavior are
manifest.”208 Although he models his friendship judgment rule after
the business judgment rule, there are at least two important ways
in which the former diverges from the latter.
First, the purpose of the friendship judgment rule is not to benefit
the beneficiary but rather to make the unworkable proposal
manageable.209 However, a vulnerable friend (in this case, the
beneficiary of the friendship) who has been abused by another friend
(the fiduciary) would surely desire protections ex post. In fact, he
likely would desire them ex ante, as well, in order to prevent abuse.
If he were not to desire such protections ex ante, the reason would
have nothing to do with his role as a beneficiary; it would be because
204. Id. at 666.
205. Id. at 666-67.
206. See Eric Goldman, I’m Not Sure I Want to Be Ethan Leib’s Friend Any More,
CONGLOMERATE (July 30, 2008), https://www.theconglomerate.org/2008/07/eric-goldman-on.
html [https://perma.cc/9RYG-WSTU].
207. See id.
208. Leib, supra note 8, at 709-10.
209. In fact, Leib’s proposals are discussed under the heading “How To Treat Friends as
Legal Fiduciaries.” Id. at 707.
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he would not want fiduciary duties to be applied to himself when he
is acting as a fiduciary. This is entirely different from the rationale
of the business judgment rule, which is premised on the benefit of
underprotection to shareholders as beneficiaries.210 Thus, the
business judgment rule preserves the most fundamental principle
of fiduciary law—the protection of the beneficiary from abuse at the
hands of the fiduciary—while a friendship judgment rule would not.
The second problem with this proposal is that it does not do much
to solve the problem because such a rule would only apply to duty
of care cases, whereas the real problems arise in duty of loyalty
cases. Therefore, Leib further proposes that duty of loyalty cases not
be strictly enforced.211 He argues by analogy to the law of close
corporations.212 That analogy makes sense in principle, because just
as partners are all equally fiduciaries and beneficiaries of each
other, the same can be said of friends. However, Leib simplifies
corporate law too much. He argues that, with respect to close
corporations, “courts tend to employ ‘remedial approaches which
focus on the putative fiduciary’s wrongful conduct’ rather than on
‘prophylactic fiduciary principles to prevent or resolve intra-
corporate conflicts’ or on ‘the beneficiary’s best interests.’”213 In fact,
however, corporate law is not quite as deferential as Leib suggests.
In close corporations, prohibited conduct includes far more than
merely engaging in “wrongful conduct” such as fraud or violation of
clearly identifiable rights. Rather, the courts tend to prevent major-
ity shareholders from frustrating the “reasonable expectations” of
minority shareholders.214 This is a demanding standard. To require
a judicial resolution of friendship disputes in order to determine
whether a given expectation is reasonable would be impractical and
lead to great uncertainty.
Generally, when corporate law encounters a conflict of interest,
it requires judicial review unless the decision is shifted to
210. See supra Part II.B.
211. See Leib, supra note 8, at 710-12.
212. See id. at 711.
213. Id. (quoting Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Death of Fiduciary Duty in Close Corporations,
138 U. PA. L. REV. 1675, 1676 (1990)).
214. See, e.g., In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1173, 1179 (N.Y. 1984); Meiselman
v. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551, 559 (N.C. 1983).
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appropriate unconflicted decision makers.215 In the context of
friendship, there is no such decision maker available. The only
possibility would be third-party friends, but such an option would
be unworkable216 even in the unlikely situation that it could be
considered legitimate.217
Thus, friendship would not be workable as a class of fiduciary
relationships. Leib realizes this,218 and tries to make it more work-
able by resorting to the business judgment rule.219 However, his
efforts are unsuccessful. Fiduciary law principles do not fit friend-
ship relationships, and the business judgment rule does not help
them to do so. Thus, friendship should not be considered a fiduciary
relationship.220
2. Parents
Elizabeth Scott and Robert Scott have argued that parents should
be considered fiduciaries.221 For many it would seem obvious that
parents should be considered fiduciaries, and some foreign jurisdic-
tions consider them to be.222 However, as Scott and Scott admit, the
United States does not.223 Nevertheless, the authors do not spend
very much time arguing that the category of parenting meets the
criteria of a fiduciary relationship. They merely point out that
parenting “shares important features with other legal relation-
ships that have been ... defined” as fiduciary in nature, such as
215. See supra notes 163-64 and accompanying text.
216. Different friends would likely come to different conclusions without regard to legal
principles. The person who got to choose the “unconflicted” friend to decide the question would
likely get to decide the outcome indirectly.
217. Unlike directors and shareholders, third-party friends have no authority in the
friendship relationship in question. See Velasco, supra note 35, at 91. Thus, their decisions
would lack inherent legitimacy, which could only be created by mutual consent.
218. See Leib, supra note 8, at 711 (“[I]t would be very hard to require friends to be fully
altruistic.”).
219. See id. at 709-10.
220. In fact, it should not be considered an important factor in determining whether
another relationship should be considered fiduciary, either.
221. Scott & Scott, supra note 9, at 2401; see also Elizabeth S. Scott & Ben Chen, Fiduciary
Principles in Family Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 6, at 227,
227.
222. See, e.g., Lionel Smith, Parenthood Is a Fiduciary Relationship, 70 U. TORONTO L. J.
395, 396 (2020) (discussing a Canadian court case recognizing parents as fiduciaries).
223. Scott & Scott, supra note 9, at 2407-08.
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“information asymmetries,” “discretion,” and “vulnerab[ility].”224
These factors generally do appear in fiduciary relationships;
however, without more, they are inadequate to sustain the categori-
zation of a relationship as fiduciary under fiduciary law principles.
Scott and Scott’s argument is not so much that parenting is a
fiduciary relationship as that it could be and should be. They believe
that fiduciary law principles would be helpful “to advance the
interests of children,”225 a normative goal that they assume.226 Thus,
they seek to develop a “relational model of parents as fiduciaries.”227
Rather than following a typical doctrinal approach, this model
focuses on how legal and extralegal devices employ monitoring and
bonding arrangements to reduce conflicts of interest at the least
cost.228 Although this model can generate interesting insights into
fiduciary relationships, it can do so equally well for nonfiduciary
relationships. Monitoring and bonding are not fiduciary-specific
concepts.229 Thus, demonstrating that these concepts can be helpful
for considering the regulation of parenting does not establish that
parenting should be considered a fiduciary relationship.
Applying their model, Scott and Scott argue that intact families
are sufficiently regulated by extralegal forces as to not need the type
of strict legal enforcement of fiduciary duties that usually accom-
pany fiduciary status, while non-intact families require more
enforcement.230 For present purposes, it may be easily granted that
224. Id. at 2402, 2420.
225. Id. at 2403 n.5; see also id. at 2418 (“[F]amily law could usefully employ analogies
drawn from the legal treatment of other relationships similarly subject to substantial conflicts
of interest.... [F]iduciary relationships seem particularly relevant, and on inspection the
relationship between parent and child shares many features in common with this category
of relationships. Indeed, the fiduciary heuristic seems to capture the essence of the argument
for a legal regime that is grounded in parental obligation to serve the child’s interests.”).
226. Id. at 2403 n.5 (“The utility of this perspective depends in part on whether the
normative premise of the focus on children’s welfare is attractive, a point which might be
debated. We do not propose to enter this debate. Rather, our purpose is to examine the
implications of thinking about family relationships from a fiduciary perspective, assuming
that the normative goal is to advance the interests of children.”).
227. Id. at 2404, 2430.
228. Id. at 2421-22.
229. Cf. Seth Davis, The False Promise of Fiduciary Government, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1145, 1165 (2014) (“Many of corporate law’s monitoring and bonding mechanisms—disclosure
and reporting requirements, incentive-based compensation, and the like—have little to do
with [various] fiduciary duties.”).
230. Scott & Scott, supra note 9, at 2452 (“The character of legal regulation will differ
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intact families would require less legal regulation than non-intact
families. But that in no way suggests that fiduciary law is the ap-
propriate type of regulation. Extralegal and legal mechanisms are
potential substitutes for one another in all areas of law. The fact
that extralegal mechanisms are generally satisfactory in intact
families actually suggests that fiduciary law principles are not
necessary to protect parenting. The fact that extralegal mechanisms
are generally insufficient in the context of non-intact families
suggests that more legal regulation is necessary, but it does not
indicate that the regulation should be by way of fiduciary law.
In any event, the purpose of this Section is to show that applying
fiduciary law principles to parenting would be unworkable. Scott
and Scott are aware of the difficulties involved.231 Most importantly,
the parenting relationship is simply too broad—and the authors
admit as much.232 Moreover, it would be impossible to eliminate
conflicts of interest.233 Parents give of themselves, of their time, and
of their wealth to raise their children.234 Thus, parenting necessarily
involves conflicts of interest.235 This strongly suggests that fiduciary
law principles are inapposite.236 Although conflicts are inevitable,
depending on whether or not the family is intact. In the intact family, extralegal norms do
much of the work to promote desired parental behavior.... The optimal regulatory patterns
change when the subject of legal regulation is the non-custodial parent. Here, legal regulatory
prescriptions are necessary substitutes for the informal norms that are relied upon in the
intact family.”).
231. Id. at 2402 (“Particular features of the parent-child relationship distinguish it from
most traditional fiduciary relationships ... and thus present some unique challenges. This
relationship is broader in scope than are many other fiduciary relationships. Beyond this, the
parental relationship, once established, has intrinsic value for the child that extends beyond
successful performance of caretaking tasks.”).
232. Id.; see also id. at 2416 (“The scope of the relationship between parents and children
and the range of parenting tasks are very broad.”).
233. Cf. id. at 2430 (“Given the extensive scope of the relationship, a prescription that
parents must systematically subordinate their personal interest to that of the child when the
two are in conflict seems unduly burdensome.”).
234. Cf. id. at 2416 (“Parenting places substantial demands on the time, energy and
resources of those who undertake the job, and good parenting requires giving the role a high
priority relative to others in parents’ lives.”).
235. Cf. id. at 2416-17 (“Inevitably, parents experience conflicts between the claims of
parental obligation and other interests that may interfere with the fulfillment of parental
duty.”).
236. It is worth noting that the conflicts involved in parenting are entirely different than
the kind involved in classic fiduciary relationships. In fiduciary relationships, the fiduciary
is tempted to use the beneficiary’s assets or powers for his own benefit. See Miller, supra note
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parents can be encouraged and even required “to perform the
services of parenthood with reasonable diligence.”237 However,
fiduciary law is not necessary for this purpose. Moreover, because
“undivided and unselfish loyalty” is not possible, fiduciary law is
inappropriate.238
To overcome this burden, Scott and Scott develop a presumption
that they call a “parental judgment rule.”239 Although this label is
intentionally reminiscent of the business judgment rule and
described as “analogous” to it,240 it is not the same. The authors
acknowledge that “even the relaxed standard for avoiding conflicts
of interest between corporate directors and shareholders would be
costly if applied to parents.”241 Yet they never define the scope of
their desired presumption. The most obvious and crucial difference
is that the business judgment rule provides no protection for
conflicts of interest, while Scott and Scott’s proposed parental
judgment rule does.242 Apparently, the parental judgment rule is a
broad rule of deference to parental judgment when extralegal
mechanisms are adequate to protect the interests of the child—for
example, in intact families.243 But this amounts to an admission that
the protections of fiduciary law are unnecessary in intact families.
Scott and Scott argue that extralegal mechanisms break down
with respect to non-intact families, and greater legal regulation
becomes necessary.244 This can easily be admitted, but that does not
mean that fiduciary law is the appropriate means of regulation.
Moreover, non-intact family parenting presents the same difficul-
ties as intact family parenting: the relationship remains broad and
34, at 972. In parenting, the parent is torn as to the use of the parent’s assets and powers, not
the beneficiary’s. There is a conflict of interests, but it is not in the nature of a fiduciary
conflict. See Velasco, supra note 35, at 93.
237. Scott & Scott, supra note 9, at 2419.
238. See Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939).
239. Scott & Scott, supra note 9, at 2438.
240. Id. at 2437-38.
241. Id. at 2437.
242. See id. at 2437-38.
243. See id.
244. Id. at 2446-51.
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conflicts of interest remain unavoidable.245 Thus, fiduciary law
principles remain inappropriate. Some other solution is necessary.
At the very least, it is clear that corporate law does not provide
the model for expanding fiduciary law into family law. The business
judgment rule, which underenforces the duty of care but not the
duty of loyalty,246 would be inadequate. Scott and Scott’s parental
judgment rule extends to conflicts of interest situations and thus
cannot be fairly said to be modeled after the business judgment
rule.247 Nor would corporate law’s means of eliminating a conflict of
interest be available in the context of parenting. In order to reclaim
the protections of the business judgment rule, corporate law
requires that conflicts of interest be decided by unconflicted
parties.248 The most obvious alternative would be the courts, but
Scott and Scott clearly want to avoid excessive legal intrusion into
the parent-child relationship.249 The other options for unconflicted
decision makers in corporate law are directors (fiduciaries) and
shareholders (beneficiaries). However, parenting offers no workable
analogs. The direct analog to unconflicted directors would be
unconflicted parents, but there are none.250 The direct analog to
unconflicted shareholders would be unconflicted siblings, but
presumably children are not adequate decision makers. Thus, the
corporate law paradigm would require judicial involvement in all
conflict situations—which is essentially to say that it would require
constant judicial involvement.251
In conclusion, fiduciary law principles could not realistically be
applied to the parenting relationship. Scott and Scott realize this
and try to develop a rule of deferential enforcement patterned after
corporate law’s business judgment rule. However, the corporate law
principles do not make the situation any more workable. Thus, what
Scott and Scott seek is not really a “parental judgment rule,” but
245. In addition, the conflicts remain of a different nature than in fiduciary relationships.
See supra note 236 and accompanying text.
246. See generally Velasco, supra note 89, at 66-70.
247. See Scott & Scott, supra note 9, at 2424, 2438.
248. See supra Part II.C.
249. See Scott & Scott, supra note 9, at 2417, 2441.
250. This is true in both intact and non-intact families. See Velasco, supra note 35, at 93.
251. Arguably, an analog to the courts would be some sort of state agency. In either case,
legal enforcement would be necessary.
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rather a rule of deferential enforcement. It seems that what they
really want is the rhetoric of fiduciary law without the consequences
that follow. In such a situation, metaphor is a better solution than
law.
3. Politicians
Teddy Rave has argued that politicians should be considered
fiduciaries.252 He acknowledges the difficulties with doing so, but he
argues that the “corporate law framework” can help to overcome
these obstacles.253 The corporate law framework that Rave relies on
consists of the business judgment rule coupled with the fairness
test.254
This example is significantly more delicate than the previous two.
The shift from private law to public law makes a big difference for
various reasons.255 However, these are all beyond the scope of this
Article. I set aside issues relating to the fundamental legitimacy of
Rave’s claims and focus exclusively on issues of fit: whether fidu-
ciary law can be applied to politicians as a practical matter and
whether the business judgment rule (or the corporate law frame-
work) helps mitigate any problems. I maintain that the answer is no
to both questions.
To begin with, as with friends and parents, there is a significant
issue as to politicians regarding the scope of the fiduciary relation-
ship. On the surface, this might not seem to be the case. After all,
the political relationship could easily be cabined to the act of
legislating, making it seem to be an extremely narrow relationship.
However, legislation itself is entirely open-ended. This means that
252. See Rave, supra note 10, at 677.
253. Id. at 723 (“A similar framework can help to address the agency problem in the
political process, without forcing courts to make the types of judgments for which we question
their institutional competence.”).
254. See id.
255. Fiduciary law is a private law concept and is not easily transferred to public law. Id.
at 718 (“One must be careful in drawing analogies from private law.”). In addition, imposing
fiduciary law on politicians raises serious constitutional law issues. Id. at 720 (“Many would
contend that judicial review is usually reserved for textually enumerated constitutional
rights.”). For a general critique of applying fiduciary law principles to governance, see
generally Samuel L. Bray & Paul B. Miller, Against Fiduciary Constitutionalism, 106 VA. L.
REV. 1479 (2020); Davis, supra note 229.
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lawmakers are deciding everything for their beneficiaries, at least
potentially. Moreover, almost any piece of legislation could be the
basis for a conflict of interest for at least some legislators, and each
legislator could be expected to face conflicts on many subjects that
they will have to vote upon. This is problematic because the
corporate law model breaks down if there are many unavoidable
conflicts of interest.256
Rave attempts to avoid the problem of scope by advancing a very
narrow position. He argues that “political representatives should
also be treated as fiduciaries, subject to a duty of loyalty, which they
breach when they manipulate election laws to their own advan-
tage.”257 Moreover, he claims to limit his “focus to gerrymandering
in state legislatures because that is the area where the conflict of
interest is most stark.”258 As a result, he does not propose a fully
developed theory of the applicability of fiduciary law to politicians.
Although a detailed theory may not be necessary to address the
specific issue on which he focuses, a robust understanding of the
corporate law model and the theory behind the business judgment
rule is necessary in order to determine whether they can be adopted
in the political realm. As I will show, they cannot. First, the
rationale of the business judgment rule does not apply to politics.
Second, a more detailed understanding of how the corporate law
model works reveals that it would not be very useful in the political
realm.
First, there is theory. Rave does not seem to appreciate the
pervasive nature of fiduciary principles in corporate law. He does
not acknowledge the extensive demands of fiduciary duty on all
business decisions.259 Instead, he quickly jumps to the deference of
the business judgment rule, noting that “[i]n most transactions,
courts adopt a deferential approach to reviewing the business
judgments of corporate directors.”260 His understanding of the
rationale for this deference is not very robust, relying almost
256. See generally Velasco, supra note 1, at 165.
257. Rave, supra note 10, at 677.
258. Id. at 678. Despite the limited focus, Rave discusses various cases involving
congressional redistricting throughout his paper. See id. at 688-91, 724 n.303.
259. Cf. supra note 4 and accompanying text.
260. Rave, supra note 10, at 700.
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entirely on the “institutional incompetence” of the courts.261
Although this is one justification for the business judgment rule, it
is only a small part of the picture. Courts are institutionally in-
competent as to many—arguably, most—matters that come before
them, but this is not enough to create a generally applicable rule of
judicial deference.262 The business judgment rule is special. If the
corporate law model is to be the basis for extending fiduciary law
into the political sphere, there must be a stronger nexus between
the business judgment rule and any political judgment rule.
The other justifications for the business judgment rule do not
transfer very well to the political realm. Citizens cannot be said to
voluntarily assume the risk of politics because they have no means
of avoiding such risk. Unlike investors who can avoid risky stock,
citizens cannot avoid legislation by not voting. In addition, there is
no reason to suppose that they want to incentivize risky behavior by
politicians. Thus, risk is not a reason to protect politicians’ decisions
from judicial review. Nor could it be said that citizens trust their
politicians because their interests are aligned. The multivariable
nature of politics makes alignment difficult to assert, and the
current polarized state of political affairs makes the claim seem
entirely implausible. One could more plausibly argue that other
market forces—including elections themselves—are sufficient to
obviate the need for strict enforcement of fiduciary duties.263
However, this is debatable at best and almost certainly incorrect as
to permanent minorities.264 In short, the rationale of the business
judgment rule is not applicable to the political realm, and thus it
cannot reasonably be the basis for a political judgment rule.265
Without the business judgment rule, courts frequently would be
required to enforce fiduciary duties. If so, this would be true not
261. Id.
262. See Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Business Judgment Rule: Meaningless Verbiage or
Misguided Notion?, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 287, 307 (1994) (“[S]uch lack of judicial expertise does
not distinguish business decisions from medicine and innumerable other fields in which the
negligence system holds sway.” (footnotes omitted)). 
263. See, e.g., Rave, supra note 10, at 716.
264. See, e.g., Oliver Hall, Death by a Thousand Signatures: The Rise of Restrictive Ballot
Access Laws and the Decline of Electoral Competition in the United States, 29 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 407, 415-16 (2005).
265. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
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only for process but also for substance.266 Rave acknowledges that
this would be problematic.267 Institutional incompetence is one
strong argument against expansive judicial review. Constitutional
concerns, such as separation of powers, provide another set of
reasons why it would not be considered desirable.268 On the level of
fundamental principles of fiduciary law, it would be almost impossi-
ble to identify the interests of the beneficiary-citizens that the
fiduciary-politicians would be charged with pursuing in a multi-
cultural society.269 There is no single goal, such as wealth maximiza-
tion, to focus on.270 To the contrary, the goal of social welfare is
entirely open-ended and therefore difficult to review objectively.
Thus, politics is not a good fit for fiduciary law.
Second, there is practice. Rave’s account of the corporate law
model is perfectly reasonable as an overview but a little too
simplistic for purposes of implementation. A more detailed under-
standing of the corporate law model reveals that it would not work
as he hopes. For example, the protections of the business judgment
rule are not lost whenever there is a conflict of interest.271 In order
to invoke the fairness test, the conflict must rise to the level of self-
dealing.272 Self-dealing is a narrow concept. “Classic examples of
[self-dealing] ... involve either a director appearing on both sides of
266. See Velasco, supra note 202, at 829-30 (“[T]he business judgment rule consists of two
separate components: one dealing with process and one dealing with substance.”).
267. See Rave, supra note 10, at 723.
268. Cf. id. at 720 (“Many would contend that judicial review is usually reserved for
textually enumerated constitutional rights.” (citing Frank H. Easterbrook, Textualism and
the Dead Hand, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1119, 1121-22 (1998))).
269. See id. at 719 (“[O]n most issues the people’s interests will diverge and will often be
in direct conflict. Even identifying the relevant group of people to consider as the principal is
not straightforward.”); see also Davis, supra note 229, at 1206 (“Politicians ... are not like
private fiduciaries. They do not serve discrete classes of beneficiaries, and they are subject to
demands that cannot be distilled into a discrete maximand.”).
270. See Rave, supra note 10, at 718-19 (“In a public corporation, ... the primary interest
of the principals is generally presumed to be fairly uniform—to maximize shareholder value.
In the political context, on the other hand, the interests of the principals are far from
uniform.” (footnote omitted)); see also Davis, supra note 229, at 1150 (“There is no single
maximand that a public official must pursue, and no generally accepted means for her to
pursue it.”).
271. See Rave, supra note 10, at 678 (“[W]hen corporate agents engage in conflicted
transactions, courts apply a strict standard of review.”).
272. See Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971) (“[T]he intrinsic fairness
standard ... will be applied only when the fiduciary duty is accompanied by self-dealing.”).
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a transaction or a director receiving a personal benefit from a
transaction not received by the shareholders generally.”273 Self-
dealing is likely to have limited applicability in politics. For
example, in gerrymandering, it would only apply when politicians
are redrawing their own districts. This is why Rave focuses on
redistricting at the state level—it is the easy case.274 However, when
state legislators are redrawing congressional districts, there is no
self-dealing. The state politicians are disinterested because they
have no direct benefit. Neither is there self-dealing when there is
bipartisan gerrymandering.275 Thus, the fairness test would not
apply and the deference of the business judgment rule would shield
most gerrymandering. In fact, because of the self-dealing require-
ment, the fairness test would apply to very few cases.276
273. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 362 (Del. 1993).
274. See Rave, supra note 10, at 724 n.303 (discussing the complexity of extending his
analysis to gerrymandering of congressional districts).
275. Rave argues that bipartisan gerrymandering is “[p]erhaps even more insidious.” Id.
at 682. However, he does not demonstrate how it amounts to self-dealing in the corporate law
sense. The negotiation and compromise involved are incompatible with a claim of classical
self-dealing.
276. Perhaps it could be argued that self-dealing is not so limited. After all, the definition
of self-dealing includes not only situations in which the fiduciary appears on both sides of the
transaction but also situations in which the fiduciary receives a personal benefit not received
by the beneficiaries generally. See Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 362. Legislation in which
politicians get something to the exclusion of all others may be fairly rare, but legislation in
which politicians get benefits that are not shared “equally” by all seems inevitable. If self-
dealing were to cover such situations, and there is corporate case law to support the claim,
see, e.g., Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 624 (Del. 1984) (“Directorial interest exists whenever
... a director either has received, or is entitled to receive, a personal financial benefit from the
challenged transaction which is not equally shared by the stockholders.”), then the concept
of self-dealing would become quite capacious. Its reach would extend far beyond voting
matters and could apply to just about any type of legislation. Consider, for example, tax
legislation. Given a tax code embodying progressive taxation along with numerous deductions
and exemptions, any tax legislation would involve benefits that are not equally shared by all.
Most other legislation would have similar, if less obvious, characteristics. However, if this is
what is meant by self-dealing, then the benefits of the business judgment rule would be lost
because the courts would have to be involved quite often.
Implicitly, Rave seems to want to make a different but similar move. He seems to want the
concept of self-dealing to go beyond direct personal gain and include indirect partisan benefits.
See Rave, supra note 10, at 686 (“In a world with national political parties, members of
Congress have an interest in state elections and state legislators have an interest in
congressional elections.”). This would allow the courts to review congressional redistricting
by state legislators. See id. at 724 n.303 (“It may also be possible to apply this framework to
gerrymandering of congressional districts, but doing so requires a few more steps.”). This
would be a radical development. Most legislation could be said to have significant partisan
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Moreover, the fairness test is not quite as strict as Rave imagines.
Despite some dicta to the contrary, the fairness test is not truly out-
come determinative.277 Courts have indicated that perfection is not
required; only fairness is.278 Thus, even if a plaintiff could get the
fairness test, it would not necessarily provide as much protection as
Rave imagines. In addition, the typical remedy for self-dealing is to
disallow the transaction in question279—not to substitute another
transaction in its place.280 While invalidating a questionable
transaction is likely to solve the problem in corporate law, striking
down a questionable law and returning to the status quo ante is
unlikely to be a sufficient remedy in many political situations,
including many voting rights cases.281 Finally, politicians would not
necessarily fear the fairness test as much as Rave imagines.
Directors fear litigation primarily because of the risk of personal
liability.282 Because that is generally not a concern for politicians,283
influence. As a result, there would be no easy way to limit judicial review. It seems that, in
order to get the benefits of the business judgment rule in the political setting, the concept of
self-dealing must be narrowly circumscribed.
277. See Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1376 (Del. 1993) (“It is sometimes thought that
the decision whether to apply the business judgment rule or the entire fairness test can be
outcome-determinative.... Application of the entire fairness rule does not, however, always
implicate liability of the conflicted corporate decisionmaker, nor does it necessarily render the
decision void.” (citation omitted)).
278. See Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1179 (Del. 1995) (“A finding of
perfection is not a sine qua non in an entire fairness analysis.”); see also Weinberger v. UOP,
Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 709 n.7 (Del. 1983) (“[P]erfection is not possible, or expected.”); Dell, Inc.
v. Magnetar Glob. Event Driven Master Fund Ltd., 177 A.3d 1, 23 (Del. 2017) (“To be sure,
‘fair value’ does not equal ‘best value.’”).
279. Rave acknowledges this. Rave, supra note 10, at 719-20 (“Just as the remedy for
breach of the duty of loyalty in agency or corporate law is invalidation of the conflicted
transaction, the remedy for a law passed in breach of representatives’ duty of loyalty should
be invalidation of the law.”).
280. Admittedly, the courts have broad discretion as to remedies. See Weinberger, 457 A.2d
at 714. However, the imposition of a substitute transaction would be virtually unheard of in
corporate law.
281. An extreme example can be found in the facts underlying the watershed case of
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). States had been exceedingly negligent in redistricting
their legislatures to account for population changes over the years, leading to widely
disproportionate representation in the legislatures. Id. at 540. Under such circumstances,
merely striking down new redistricting legislation would be the equivalent of permitting
legislative inaction: in either case, the old, unfair system remains intact. See id. at 569-70.
The solution to the problem would be to demand appropriate redistricting, but that is not the
kind of remedy that the fairness test yields. See supra note 280 and accompanying text.
282. See Velasco, supra note 13, at 656 (“[T]he risk of personal liability would lead directors
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they might be perfectly willing to risk litigation in order to achieve
their desired goals.
Rave goes on to note that, in corporate law, fairness review can be
avoided by having disinterested and independent parties decide
matters involving conflicts of interest.284 If this is done, the defer-
ence of the business judgment rule is restored.285 Rave then explores
various ways that independent committees could be established.286
While his “truly independent districting commissions”287 may well
be ideal, it is unlikely that they would be required by the corporate
law model. Best practices are not mandatory in corporate law, and
fiduciaries can get by with significantly less.288 Lack of independ-
ence in the corporate law sense requires that the decision maker be
controlled or dominated, such that their discretion is sterilized and
they are incapable of making impartial decisions.289 Because the
concept is so narrow, it would not be very difficult to staff commit-
tees with partisans that could be expected to deliver the desired
results and still survive judicial scrutiny. Something similar hap-
pens in corporate law all the time: independent committees usually
to excessive risk aversion. Exculpation provisions allow corporations to eliminate that risk,
but not the other benefits of the duty of care.”). A secondary concern with liability is that it
could slow down and therefore undermine a merger or other transaction. This, however, is not
a great concern in politics, where delay is often inevitable and expected.
283. Cf. Wuterich v. Murtha, 562 F.3d 375, 380 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“The Federal Employees
Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988, commonly known as the Westfall Act,
‘accords federal employees absolute immunity from common-law tort claims arising out of acts
they undertake in the course of their official duties.’ The Westfall Act’s ‘core purpose,’ as the
Supreme Court has explained, ‘is to relieve covered employees from the cost and effort of
defending the lawsuit, and to place those burdens on the Government’s shoulders.’” (quoting
Osborn v. Haley, 549 U.S. 225, 229, 252 (2007))).
284. Rave, supra note 10, at 695. It is worth noting that there must be a limit to the
number and types of matters that could legitimately be delegated to independent committees.
Ultimately, legislative power is granted to the legislatures, and legislatures must be able to
legislate. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be
vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of
Representatives.”). While independent committees might work when limited to one or a few
matters, they could not be employed for all conflicts of interest, as they can in corporate law.
285. See Rave, supra note 10, at 705.
286. See id. at 728-39 (discussing “[p]rocess [s]afe [h]arbors for [r]edistricting”).
287. See id. at 730.
288. Cf. In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 697 (Del. Ch. 2005)
(“Delaware law does not—indeed, the common law cannot—hold fiduciaries liable for a failure
to comply with the aspirational ideal of best practices.”).
289. See Julian Velasco, The Diminishing Duty of Loyalty, 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1035,
1071-72 (2018) (citing cases).
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recommend dismissal of derivative litigation and their decisions
are generally upheld.290
In truth, Rave’s main concern—entrenchment—likely would not
be evaluated under the fairness test at all. Rather, corporate law
evaluates entrenchment issues under an intermediate standard of
review.291 Rave suggests that issues may be evaluated under the
Blasius standard.292 However, in corporate law this standard applies
only if a plaintiff could establish that the rule in question was
adopted for the primary purpose of thwarting an election.293 This is
a standard that is not easily met and is “applied rarely.”294 More-
over, Blasius cases do not tend to involve voting rules of general
applicability, but rather intentional director interference with par-
ticular elections.295 Thus, it is not clear that Blasius would be the
appropriate standard. More likely, the action may be judged under
a “reasonableness” standard.296 This is the standard applied in
hostile takeovers, in which directors must respond to the hostile
bid—as politicians must create legislative districts—even though
there is “the omnipresent specter that a board may be acting
primarily in its own interests, rather than those of the corporation
and its shareholders.”297 Ultimately, the reasonableness standard
290. See FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW 434 & n.107 (2d ed. 2010); cf. The Long
Form, CHANCERY DAILY (Chancery Daily, Wilmington, Del.), July 16, 2020, https://mailchi.mp/
chancerydaily/the-long-form-july_16_2020_1055937-1057298 [https://perma.cc/SM2S-KT5L]
(describing In re Oracle Derivative Litigation as “an exceedingly rare example of a stockholder
derivative action in which a Special Litigation Committee of nominal defendant’s board
concluded, following an investigation of stockholder plaintiff’s claims, that the company would
be best served by permitting plaintiff to litigate its claims on the company’s behalf ” (citing
824 A.2d 917 (Del. Ch. 2003))).
291. See Allen et al., supra note 120, at 1290-93 (discussing “a third category” of fiduciary
duty claims “where the directors have no direct pecuniary interest in the transaction but have
an ‘entrenchment’ interest,” and proposing a unified intermediate standard of review).
292. See Rave, supra note 10, at 714-15 (first quoting Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp.,
564 A.2d 651, 660 (Del. Ch. 1988); and then citing MM Cos. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d
1118, 1132 (Del. 2003)).
293. Blasius Indus., 564 A.2d at 660-62; MM Cos., 813 A.2d at 1130.
294. Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1376 (Del. 1996).
295. See, e.g., Blasius Indus., 564 A.2d at 654-55; MM Cos., 813 A.2d at 1124.
296. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985); see also Unitrin,
Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995). 
297. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954. In typical duty of loyalty cases, the fiduciary has engaged in
a transaction that he could have avoided entirely. See Velasco, supra note 202, at 874. Thus,
to require the fiduciary to establish fairness or have the transaction voided is sensible.
However, certain types of transactions absolutely demand a director response despite obvious
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does not provide much more judicial scrutiny than the business
judgment rule itself.298 Thus, it is not clear that the corporate law
model can deal with entrenchment as Rave would like it to.
In short, the corporate law model does not transfer well into the
political realm. The rationale of the business judgment rule does not
support the creation of a political judgment rule; the fairness test
does not provide as much protection as Rave suspects; independence
is a narrower concept than might be expected; and intermediate
standards of review are not very helpful. Thus, the corporate law
model is simply not an appropriate basis for expanding fiduciary
law into politics.
CONCLUSION
The thesis of this Article is that the business judgment rule can-
not be the basis for the indiscriminate expansion of fiduciary law
principles into new areas of law. This is because the business
judgment rule is not merely an arbitrary rule of deference but
rather a principled policy of underenforcement that is intended to
benefit primarily the beneficiaries of the fiduciary relationship in
the idiosyncratic context of business. As such, it is entirely consis-
tent with the purposes of fiduciary law. Attempting to apply the
deference of the business judgment rule in settings in which it
would not be primarily for the benefit of the beneficiaries would not
be consistent with fiduciary law principles. Thus, these potential
applications would be inconsistent with the business judgment rule.
I conclude with a clarification of the various positions that I have
not taken in this Article. By clearly delineating the limits of my
argument, it may be possible to determine the space that remains
available for some type of fiduciary judgment rule. To begin with, I
have not argued that the business judgment rule must be limited to
corporate law and cannot be the basis for a fiduciary judgment rule
in any other area of law. This is clearly not the case: the business
judgment rule is applied not only in corporate law, but also in the
conflicts of interest. In such cases, the courts often apply a reasonableness test. See id. at 875.
298. See generally Velasco, supra note 289, at 1069 (“[I]ntermediate standards of review
have not panned out as expected.... [C]ourts seem inevitably to find their way back to a
deferential standard of review.”).
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law of other forms of business organization such as partnerships
and limited liability companies.299 Rather, my argument is that the
business judgment rule should only be utilized in settings in which
its rationale is applicable. This is most clearly the case in other
forms of business organization. Although there may be some
differences between corporations and partnerships or limited
liability companies—and these differences may even relate to some
of the justifications for the business judgment rule—the similarities
among them are nevertheless significant, making the adoption of
the business judgment rule an easy choice. Ultimately, it should not
be surprising that all businesses could benefit from a business
judgment rule.
However, my argument does not foreclose the possibility that
other, nonbusiness relationships could also be similar enough that
the business judgment rule could provide the foundation for a
fiduciary judgment rule. As I have suggested, the core principles
would be first, that pervasive fiduciary duties could be enforced, and
second, that under-enforcement is a policy choice made for the
benefit of the beneficiary qua beneficiary. It would not matter that
others could also benefit from the deference, provided that the
benefit to the beneficiary is sufficiently clear and substantial as to
justify the underenforcement on its own. If other relationships and
circumstances can meet these criteria, then adopting the corporate
law rule might be appropriate in such cases.
In addition, my arguments have not ruled out the possibility of a
rule of deference that is not based on the business judgment rule.
The amount of enforcement that is given to any law or rule is itself
a policy question. No law is ever enforced perfectly, and thus all
laws are underenforced.300 It is possible to conclude that fiduciary
duties should be less rigorously enforced in some circumstances
than in others.
For example, one possible reason for underenforcement would be
scarcity of resources. It may be that fiduciary law principles are
299. See, e.g., Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304 (Del. 2015) (applying
business judgment rule in the context of a limited liability company); Zoren v. Genesis Energy,
L.P., 836 A.2d 521, 528 (Del. Ch. 2003) (“[T]he business judgment rule generally protects the
actions of general partners.” (alteration in original) (quoting In re Boston Celtics Ltd. P’ship
S’holders Litig., No. C.A. 16511, 1999 WL 641902, at *5 (Del. Ch. Aug. 6, 1999))).
300. See Velasco, supra note 117, at 581.
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appropriate, but there simply are not the resources available to
enforce them strictly. This may seem unprincipled, but it is not
entirely unreasonable. However, scarcity would not seem to be a
good justification for the creation of a fiduciary judgment rule. The
issue can come up when scholars consider the expansion of fiduciary
law principles into new areas of law. In such situations, the appro-
priateness of fiduciary law principles is low because expansion
necessarily means going beyond the core. This lack of fit, when
coupled with a scarcity of resources, should suggest that expansion
ought not to be considered in the first place. Maintaining the status
quo is probably a more appropriate course of action.
A more promising rationale for a rule of deference would be
judicial incompetence. The fact that courts are not experts is a
perfectly plausible reason to limit their intrusion into decision-
making processes. Experts should not too often be second-guessed
by nonexperts. Thus, it might be sensible to limit judicial review to
situations in which there are doubts about the experts’ judgment.
This, indeed, is one of the rationales of the business judgment
rule.301 Yet this rationale is by no means limited to the business
context. Rave, for example, makes a strong argument based on
judicial incompetence to police political judgments.302 Limiting
judicial review to cases in which one has doubts about the experts’
judgment is a perfectly valid freestanding argument, and it thus
theoretically could form the basis for specific fiduciary judgment
rules without reference to the business judgment rule.
There is, however, one major concern with the argument. There
would seem to be no legitimate way to cabin it. Judges are legal
experts only. They are not business experts. They also are not
medical experts. Nor are they experts in friendship, parenting, or
politics. Indeed, they are not experts in any of the matters over
which they preside.303 If judicial incompetence is a sufficient basis
for any fiduciary judgment rule, then it would seem to be a suffi-
cient basis for every such rule. Rather than specific fiduciary
judgment rules, judicial incompetence would seem to support a
301. See supra notes 130-32 and accompanying text.
302. See generally Rave, supra note 10; D. Theodore Rave, Institutional Competence in
Fiduciary Government, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 35, at 418.
303. See supra note 262 and accompanying text.
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general fiduciary judgment rule for all fiduciary relationships.
Indeed, it would seem to support a general rule of deference ap-
plicable to all litigation, not just fiduciary relationships. Thus, the
argument proves too much. However, this is not necessarily a fatal
obstacle. One might be able to establish that judicial incompetence
is a more pronounced issue in some types of cases than in others.
Alternatively, one might prefer a general rule of deference. One
might even conclude that consistency is not the most important
value in the law and that it is worthwhile to implement a rule of
deference whenever it can be done. In short, despite the challenges,
judicial incompetence could be the basis for fiduciary judgment
rules.
Relatedly, but conceptually different, a rule of deference may be
grounded in the discretion that is afforded to fiduciaries. Many
fiduciary law scholars maintain that discretion is an essential
element of a fiduciary relationship.304 The fiduciary undertakes to
use his or her judgment for the benefit of the beneficiary. In many
cases, the fiduciary will have expertise that the beneficiary and the
courts lack. However, in some cases the fiduciary may be called to
exercise judgment without any real expertise. Nevertheless, in all
cases, it is the fiduciary’s judgment that is called for. Such judgment
arguably ought to be respected by the courts through deferential
review.
To be fair, not everyone agrees that discretion is essential to fidu-
ciary relationships.305 Only certain fiduciary relationships depend
upon discretion and expertise. This is a common characteristic of
trust relationships, for example.306 However, not all fiduciary re-
lationships are like that. For example, an agency relationship is
304. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 25, at 69 (“A fiduciary relationship is one in which one
party (the fiduciary) exercises discretionary power over the significant practical interests of
another (the beneficiary).”); D. Gordon Smith & Jordan C. Lee, Fiduciary Discretion, 75 OHIO
STATE L.J. 609, 610-11 (2014) (“We contend that the grant of discretion in fiduciary relation-
ships is not merely an artifact of human weakness, but a crucial part of the fiduciary bargain.
To borrow an expression from software design, contractual incompleteness is not a bug, it’s
a feature.”).
305. See, e.g., Arthur B. Laby, Book Review, 35 LAW & PHIL. 123, 130-34 (reviewing PHIL-
OSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 25); Evan J. Criddle, Liberty in
Loyalty: A Republican Theory of Fiduciary Law, 95 TEX. L. REV. 993, 1036-37 (2017).
306. See, e.g., GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT, GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT & AMY MORRIS HESS,
THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 560 (rev. 2d ed. Supp. 2020).
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characterized by the control of the principal rather than the
discretion of the agent.307 I have argued elsewhere that power, not
discretion, is the essence of the fiduciary relationship.308 And if that
is the case, then judicial deference to the discretionary judgment of
the fiduciary will not resonate quite so strongly. Even so, discretion
may be considered sufficiently valuable—at least when it is a key
feature of the relationship—as to deserve deference. Thus, discre-
tion could be the basis for fiduciary judgment rules in certain cases.
Other justifications for fiduciary judgment rules could be
imagined and defended. Although this Article does not provide
support for such possibilities, it does not foreclose them either. This
Article has defended a limited position: that the business judgment
rule does not provide a solid basis for the indiscriminate expansion
of fiduciary law principles into new areas of law. Properly under-
stood, the business judgment rule is not an arbitrary rule of
deference. It is an important principle, perfectly consistent with
fiduciary law, that is intended to protect the interests of the bene-
ficiary qua beneficiary. Any expansion that does not maintain this
purpose cannot be modeled after the business judgment rule.
307. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. f(1) (AM. L. INST. 2006).
308. See Velasco, supra note 35, at 83-87.
